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THE LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF THE NEW DEAL AT 70
STEVEN A. RmiREz*
Recent turbulence in the financial markets, first as a result of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and then as a result of the realization in the summer
of 2002 that corporate America was plagued by pervasive corruption,
once again has shown that capitalism needs government intervention
to thrive.' The crisis in investor confidence in the summer of 2002 in
particular refocused attention on the seventy-year-old regulatory infra-
structure imposed upon the economy as part of the New Deal.2 In
both instances, the federal government jumped to the rescue of so-
called free markets that seemed to be spinning into the abyss of seri-
ous adverse macroeconomic dysfunction.3 It wasn't always so.
* Professor, Washburn University School of Law. Professor Bill Rich and Professor
Alex Glashausser contributed many helpful insights to this Article. This Article also bene-
fited from a presentation in September 2002 at the Central States Law School Association,
hosted by the University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. One example of the strength of the consensus supporting massive government in-
volvement in our nation's economy was the swift response of the government to address
the economic consequences of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center
in New York City. On September 17, 2001, the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed") cut rates
for the eighth time that year in order to stabilize financial markets worldwide. Richard W.
Stevenson, Fed Cuts Rate by Half-Point in an Attempt to Aid Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001,
at Cl. By the end of September, in order to stem the imminent collapse of some carriers
and the cascading losses that would have hit the banking industry, the government injected
$5 billion in cash into the airline industry and stood ready to guarantee another $10 billion
in loans. Barbara A. Rehm & Laura Mandaro, U.S. Bailout for Airlines Looks Good for Lenders,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 27, 2001, at 1. On the regulatory front, the Fed injected billions of
dollars into the banking system and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
acted to encourage banks to take greater risks in lending to customers suffering adverse
consequences from the disaster. E. Scott Reckard & James S. Granelli, Lenders Look for
Economic Equilibrium, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 28, 2001, § Business, at 3. Congress quickly acted to
extend unemployment benefits to the ever increasing army of laid-off employees in the
aftermath of the attack. Delroy Alexander, Surge in Layoffs Vaults Claims to 9-Year High, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 28, 2001, § Business, at 1. Ultimately, the federal government undertook to act
as insurer of last resort with respect to the risks of terrorism, for $100 billion. Christopher
Oster, Terrorism Bill Boosts Insurers' Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002, at C9. Little protest
from laissez-faire enthusiasts arose in response to these actions.
2. See Robert Kuttner, Today's Markets Need a Whole New Set of Rules, Bus. WK., July 29,
2002, at 26 (stating that reforms designed to stem pervasive wrongdoing during the late
1920s are inadequate to stem wrongdoing today and that "laissez-faire" and "market funda-
mentalism" had proven once more to be a "disgrace").
3. For example, when President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28
U.S.C.), he specifically compared the new Act to the New Deal, stating that it contained
"'the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin
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Once upon a time, mainstream economic thought held that govern-
ment should have a highly restricted economic role.4 Indeed, Calvin
Coolidge once said that "' [i]f the Federal Government should go out
of existence, the common run of people would not detect the differ-
ence in the affairs of their daily life for a considerable length of
time.'" 5 The view was that government simply should not try to regu-
late because markets were self-correcting. 6 Government can never
spend as wisely as the markets can so government should tax little and
keep a balanced budget to avoid crowding out private investment and
destabilizing the currency.7 During this era of laissez-faire economics,
business cycles would come and go, some even severe, but eventually
the inherently self-adjusting economy would correct itself without the
need for government "intrusion."8 Then came the Great Depression.9
Delano Roosevelt."' Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms into Law; President Says Era of
'False Profits'Is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A04. For a review of the crisis in investor
confidence gripping the markets in the summer of 2002, see generally Press Release, U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Opening Statement of Sena-
tor Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD), House-Senate Conference on the Public Company Account-
ing and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (July 19, 2002), available at http://banking.senate.
gov/pre 102/0719oscf.htm.
4. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 185 (1997) (stating that the
prevailing economic doctrine of the late 1920s and early 1930s constituted a "rejection of
both fiscal... and monetary policy" and therefore "amounted precisely to a rejection of all
affirmative government economic policy").
5. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR 30 (1999) (citing 1 ARTHUR M. SCHLES-
INGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 57 (1956)).
6. See Herbert Hoover, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(December 8, 1931), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HER-
BERT HOOVER 1931, at 580, 583 (1976) (stating that "private initiative and local and com-
munity" action had been taken to address economic problems, allowing an "orderly
readjustment of costs, inventories, and credits" with the "least possible Government entry
into the economic field"); see also WILLIAM J. BARBER, FROM NEW ERA TO NEW DEAL: HER-
BERT HOOVER, THE ECONOMISTS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1921-1933, at 4 (1985)
("Standard textbook teaching typically held that economic life was governed by laws of
production, distribution, and exchange and that cyclical fluctuations in aggregate income
and output were a normal and inevitable part of the economic system's behavior.... [I]t
was heretical to suggest that" humans could repeal these laws).
7. See Herbert Hoover, Address to the Senate on the National Economy (May 31,
1932), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HERBERT HOOVER
1932-33, at 243, 243-44 (1977) (stating that in light of the economic emergency and "con-
tinued downward movement in the economic life of the country" government needed to
impose a "[d] rastic reduction of expenditures" and increase taxes, in order to balance the
federal budget and stabilize the dollar).
8. Herbert Hoover, Address to the American Bankers Association in Cleveland, Ohio
(Oct. 2, 1930), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HERBERT
HOOVER 1930, at 391, 400 (1976). In this address, President Hoover stated that "readjust-
ments in prices, which were . . . inevitable, [were] far along their course" and that "these
commodities [prices] [were] below the level at which sufficient production [could] be
maintained ...and, therefore, sooner or later [had to] recover." Id. at 393. He also
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This cataclysmic event forever changed the federal government's role
in the economy. No longer would government allow presumptively
efficient free markets to operate free of supervision; instead, the gov-
ernment would manage macroeconomic performance-gross domes-
tic product (GDP or output), unemployment, inflation or deflation,
and productivity growth.
In the face of this unprecedented and intractable calamity, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) experimented with many forms of
government action.1" FDR had some hits, some errors, and some rain-
outs." Still, this Article posits that FDR's New Deal ultimately took a
giant leap forward in demonstrating the proper role of the govern-
ment in a modern-industrial state. FDR undertook massive invest-
ment in physical infrastructure, typically a uniquely governmental
function. FDR, however, went well beyond physical infrastructure.
The New Deal revolutionized government by creating a regulatory in-
frastructure, social infrastructure, and human infrastructure that
would spur growth and stability for decades. In the final analysis, FDR
used the legal system to redefine the political economy of the United
States-from free market capitalism to a form of capitalism that was
fundamentally subject to social management and social responsibility.
The thesis of this Article is that the law and macroeconomics of the
New Deal was ultimately a search, or at least the beginning of a search,
to find the optimal legal structures to facilitate free market operation
and provide a foundation for achieving greater economic growth and
output, and other macroeconomic objectives. As such, the New Deal
emphasized that government should avoid "intrusion" in the economy, and that "[a]ny
recession" was only "temporary." Id. at 399-402.
9. Theodore Rosenof noted the following change in thinking that had been inspired
by the Great Depression:
It had taken the devastation of the Great Depression to inspire powerful chal-
lenges to orthodox theory, most notably that of Keynes. Orthodoxy had held that
the economic "system" or "mechanism" was inherently self-correcting, that down-
turns were necessarily followed by cyclical upswings, that institutional "imperfec-
tions" or external "shocks" were mere aberrations, and that government
intervention would only impede and delay normal and natural readjustment and
recovery. The Great Depression undermined such assumptions and led to the
New Deal's enhanced role for government.
THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR LEGA-
Cds, 1933-1993, at 5 (1997).
10. See infta Part II (discussing many of the key New Deal programs).
11. FDR himself openly admitted the experimental basis of the New Deal. See Franklin
D. Roosevelt, The Second "Fireside Chat" (May 7, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PMERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 160, 165 (1938) (stating "I have no expectation of
making a hit every time I come to bat.... Theodore Roosevelt once said to me: 'If I can be
right 75 percent of the time I shall come up to the fullest measure of my hopes.'").
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serves to furnish policy lessons for using law to enhance today's
macroeconomic performance.
The New Deal strived to provide a firmer framework for the suc-
cess of a market-based economy. 12 Consequently, it was a conservative
approach to the economic malaise of the 1930s, for even Adam Smith
had long ago recognized that government needed to provide the nec-
essary infrastructure for free markets to succeed.1 3 The New Deal sim-
ply updated the Adam Smith vision of the government's role to
comport with a modern, industrialized economy. For example, the
New Deal imposed a regulatory infrastructure that included elements
from Adam Smith's theory, such as the need for regulation of fraud
and the regulation of banking.14 The New Deal's massive investment
in physical infrastructure is also a page from Adam Smith's
playbook.1" Even the New Deal's emphasis on a more economically
sound social and human infrastructure is an extension of traditional
capitalistic thinking.16 In the end, FDR's legacy is a conservative ap-
proach to political economy-one that continues to allow markets to
harness individual initiative to the maximum extent possible and to
respond to individual tastes. Instead of blind adherence to laissez-
12. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Fourth "Fireside Chat" (Oct. 22, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 421 (discussing efforts
to build legal structures to support a "sound economic life").
13. 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 244 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Univ. of Chi.
Press 1976) (1776) (asserting that the government is duty bound to provide "public institu-
tions and.., public works, which .... may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great
society," but which are not profitable to any individual economic actor because of diffusion
of benefits); see also COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA,
1920-1935, at 4 (1994) (stating "[t]his study contributes to a broad stream of interpretation
that has stressed the primacy of business interests in the formulation of U.S. public policy
and the essential conservatism of the New Deal").
14. Herbert Stein, Board of Contributors: Remembering Adam Smith, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
1994, at A14 (reviewing the expansive view of government support of free market economy
from The Wealth of Nations and updating the view for a modern economy).
15. 2 SMITH, supra note 13, at 245-46.
16. See 2 id. at 302-09 (discussing government's duty to provide minimum education to
all citizens). Modern macroeconomists now recognize the critical importance of economic
infrastructure to macroeconomic performance. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones,
Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others ?, 114 Q. J. ECON.
83, 95, 113-114 (1999) (stating that successfully fostering economic growth requires appro-
priate "social infrastructure," meaning "the institutions and government policies that pro-
vide incentives for individuals and firms in the economy," beyond that needed just to
create free markets). More economists, after studying macroeconomic growth across na-
tions, have concluded that law can enhance economic growth. SeeJoseph E. Stiglitz, Some
Lessons from the East Asian Miracle, 11 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 151 (1996) (showing
that economic growth is frequently accompanied by government intervention designed to
create environments in which markets can thrive). Macroeconomics is not just about fiscal
or monetary policy anymore.
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faire efficiency, the New Deal recognized government's ability to place
capitalism upon a firmer foundation for delivering extraordinary
growth and stability to society.17 This Article will seek to define the
most durable elements of the New Deal's legacy, in terms of how law
can further economic output and other macroeconomic goals. More-
over, in light of that legacy, this Article will highlight methods of using
law to secure a more powerful political economy.
Part I of this Article will review economic thought on the Great
Depression, attempting to convey the raw human carnage that was the
Great Depression. A natural part of this analysis requires an under-
standing of just how efficient,'" from a neoclassical perspective, our
economy was in 1929, just before economic calamity set in.19 Part II
will explore the most durable and seemingly successful elements of
the New Deal, in terms of building a serviceable economic infrastruc-
17. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 74, 249 (2002) (noting
that pre-Depression laissez-faire economic policies did not work and that the onset of gov-
ernment management of macroeconomic performance has resulted in fewer and shorter
economic downturns and longer expansions).
18. Efficiency as used by most law and economics scholars has a vague, indeterminate,
and subjective meaning. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (5th ed.
1998) (defining efficiency as the "allocation of resources in which value is maximized," but
describing its limitations and how some economic theorists only define efficiency in terms
of voluntary transactions). It has definite meaning in the world of microeconomics; but
only as a theoretical construct. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMIcs 565
(10th ed. 2000) (stating that "[o]ne of the most . . . fundamental findings of
microeconomics is that a perfectly competitive economy in equilibrium satisfies the ...
conditions for economic efficiency"). This is because microeconomists recognize that no
economy is ever perfectly competitive. Id. at 270. Perfect competition rests upon theoreti-
cal assumptions that are never fulfilled-such as the requirement that all market partici-
pants possess perfect information of the past, present, and future. Id. Perfect competition
also requires zero transaction costs so that assets can move via market action to their high-
est and best use unimpeded. Id. Thus, perfect competition militates in favor of de minimus
government intervention because government action implies some additional transaction
costs.
19. Recentiy, for example, economists have highlighted the relative efficiency of the
very critical labor markets of the 1930s. Theoretically, labor markets should have adjusted
to the large unemployment at the beginning of the Depression by lowering wages and
thereby inducing higher demand for workers. Some economists previously argued that
"sticky-wage[s]" were responsible for the lack of market adjustment. See Ben S. Bernanke &
Kevin Carey, Nominal Wage Stickiness and Aggregate Supply in the Great Depression, 111 Q.J.
ECON. 853, 855-56 (1996). Bernanke and Carey, for example, stated:
During the 1930s many forces that ... economists commonly point to as condu-
cive to slow wage adjustment appeared relatively weak in most countries: union
power was at a low ebb; government's role in labor markets was generally more
limited than today; price declines were too large . . . for money illusion to be
widespread; and the existence of an army of the unemployed must have . . . re-
duced workers' bargaining power.
Id. at 855.
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ture. 2' FDR experimented with a variety of potential solutions in try-
ing to stem the pain of the Great Depression. 2 1 The National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) ,22 for example, was a conservative stab
at a self-regulated economy that largely failed and furnished no mean-
ingful legacy. Other elements, however, were economic hits-not be-
cause they instantly resolved the Depression, but because each formed
an integral part of the New Deal. Overall, these elements succeeded
in placing the American economy on a more durable, stable, and dy-
namic foundation. These are the elements that may hold lessons for
using law to manage the economy of today.23 Finally, Part III attempts
to place the law and macroeconomics of the New Deal in its proper
historical perspective; that is, as a superior normative approach to le-
gal issues relating to macroeconomic infrastructure.2 4 The implica-
tion of this is the need to expand law and economics beyond mere
microeconomic efficiency, which has been the near exclusive focus of
20. ROBERTJ. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS G4 (9th ed. 2003) (defining infrastructure as
public investment in "roads, sewers, airports, and, more broadly, education" that "pro-
vide[s] widespread benefits to consumers and raise[s] the return on private investment").
For purposes of this Article, I extend this definition of infrastructure to include the means
by which the legal system can enhance the operation of free markets by raising the return
on capital or lowering the cost of capital. This is in full accord with the fundamental point
of economist Joseph Stiglitz. See Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 157 (stating that Asian Tigers
enhanced macroeconomic performance through government intervention that "used,
complemented, regulated, and indeed created, markets rather than supplanted them").
Simply stated, government supplied infrastructure should be designed to enhance free
market performance.
21. See infra Part II (summarizing many of the key New Deal programs).
22. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Star. 195 (1933). The U.S. Supreme
Court found various portions of the NIRA to be unconstitutional. See A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (holding that discretion of the
President under Section 3 of the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (invalidating section 9(c)).
23. I admit to selecting, from an economic perspective, only the most successful New
Deal initiatives. It is justified cherry picking, however, for two reasons. First, the New Deal
proceeded while the very idea of macroeconomics was essentially subject to prohibition in
mainstream economic thought. Second, this Article does not argue the merits of the New
Deal overall, but instead only focuses on the instructive elements of the New Deal, which
naturally excludes an assessment of the New Deal's failures. See supra notes 4, 6, 9, and 11
and accompanying text (discussing the Great Depression and the restricted role that gov-
ernment should play in regulating the economy).
24. Legal scholars have previously studied the New Deal from a variety of different
legal perspectives. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (as-
sessing the New Deal as part of a theory of informal constitutional evolution);Joan Flynn,
A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1361, 1361 (2000) (reviewing the New Deal origins of the NLRB and showing that the
Board "has come 180 degrees from its origins"); Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New
Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999) (assessing the state of learning and thought on the so-
called constitutional revolution of 1937). However, no legal scholar has assessed the New
Deal in terms of its teachings on using law to enhance macroeconomic performance.
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law and economics within the legal academy25 -an expansion that ex-
plicitly recognizes the need to search for legal structures to support
higher levels of macroeconomic performance. 26
In general, law and macroeconomics has not been well-developed
in the legal academy. As one commentator has stated: "When legal
scholars and law students discuss the impact of economics on their
understanding of law, they invariably think about microeconomics, not
macroeconomics. ' 27 The problem with this focus, as will be discussed
25. Emblematic of the current law and economics curriculum is Judge Posner's fifth
edition of Economic Analysis of Law. In it, for example, Judge Posner states that "macroeco-
nomic performance, that is output, production, unemployment, and inflation, are "myste-
rious macroeconomic phenomena." POSNER, supra note 18, at 3. Indeed, while Judge
Posner identifies numerous elements of law that he deems "efficient," at no point does he
posit that such efficiency will somehow lead to more jobs, greater GDP, more economic
stability or less inflation. See id. at 12-17 (defining efficiency and explaining its limitations);
see also Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1003, 1005 (2001) (stating that, "[l]aw and economics' exclusive focus on efficiency
continues to lack justification even within the limited purview of modern economic
reasoning").
26. Some legal scholars are heavily engaged in this search. See Steven A. Ramirez, The
Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles, 70 U.
CIN. L. REv. 527, 527-32, 539-67 (2002) (arguing that courts should more explicitly enforce
the professional obligations of securities brokers because of important federal economic
policies designed to stem "speculative bubbles"); Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Finan-
cial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REv. 505, 590 (1998) (concluding that
"[a]t the least, policy intervention by regulation ... also should address the heterodox
concern that sectoral processes have the ability to unfavorably impact the entire econ-
omy"); Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(k): Congressional Subsidizing of
Negligent Bank Directors and Officers., 65 FoRtD-AM L. REv. 625, 686-88 (1996) [hereinafter
The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(k)] (arguing that huge macroeconomic losses from the
bank crisis of the late 1980s militated in favor of holding directors liable for failure to
exercise ordinary care); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REv. 595, 621-25 (1988) (discussing potential political problems in
administering fiscal policy in a democracy);Johan Deprez, Comment, Risk, Uncertainty, and
Nonergodicity in the Determination of Investment-Backed Expectations: A Post Keynesian Alternative
to Posnerian Doctrine in the Analysis of Regulatory Takings, 34 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1221, 1252-53
(2001) (concluding that "Posnerian views on efficiency, prices, valuation, decision making,
and justice cannot be sustained in the real world where true uncertainty dominates"). Ad-
ditional legal analyses based upon macroeconomic considerations are cited in this Article
in discussions of various elements of the New Deal. See infra Parts II-III.
27. Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1215, 1216 (1993); see alsoJohn J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law
and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 709, 710 (1993) (noting that "law and macroeconomics is quite novel in the legal
academic literature"). Some literature explores the impact of macroeconomic perform-
ance upon legal phenomena such as crime rates. See, e.g., Llad Phillips et al., Crime, Youth,
and the Labor Market, 80J. POL. ECON. 491, 502-03 (1972) (reaching the conclusion that a
lack of economic opportunity significantly contributed to a high youth crime rate). To a
large extent, it is understandable that there is only a scanty focus on law and macroeco-
nomics. Economists only recently started to study the determinants of macroeconomic
growth beyond traditional fiscal and monetary policy, an area in which economists histori-
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in detail, is that many of the issues that concern microeconomics are
relatively trivial in terms of their influence on macroeconomic out-
put.2" Moreover, the "continued acceptance of efficiency, but not its
premises, has produced a dissonance within law and economics that,
depending on how closely one chooses to listen, can be piercing to
the ear."29 This Article shows that the New Deal implemented basic
legal changes in our economic infrastructure that contributed in a
significant way to macroeconomic performance. This conclusion
means that law can influence macroeconomic performance in a fun-
damental and powerful way by providing a more optimal macroeco-
nomic infrastructure. Thus, this Article seeks to reveal not only that
there is a law and macroeconomics, but also that the basic elements of
the successful use of law to facilitate macroeconomic performance can
be distilled from the bootleg economics of the New Deal.
I. THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Great Depression challenged American society as never
before.3 ° It was longer and more intense than any in the earlier
parade of economic depressions, panics, and disruptions spawned by
cally have focused more on macroeconomic stability instead of growth. See supra note 16
and accompanying text (discussing evolution of macroeconomic theory). Thus, the need
for legal structures to implement the new teaching of macroeconomic growth theory has
been somewhat limited.
28. Professor Kelman illustrates this point through the example of unemployment:
"Social losses from cyclical increases in unemployment almost certainly dwarf losses from
other forms of inefficiency." See Kelman, supra note 27, at 1285. Indeed, the government
estimated in 1939 that the foregone output from the severe unemployment of the 1930s
was $200 billion (in 1939 dollars). DONALD S. HOWARD, THE WPA AND FEDERAL RELIEF
POLICY 795 (Da Capo Press 1973) (1943).
29. Sanchirico, supra note 25, at 1007. Professor Sanchirico concludes that the latest
efforts at justifying the focus of law and economics on efficiency have failed. Id. at 1069.
As Joseph Stiglitz has observed with respect to the efficiency premise of perfect informa-
tion: "The analytic propositions are clear: whenever there is imperfect information or mar-
kets (that is always), there are, in principle, interventions by the government-even a
government that suffers from the same imperfections of information-which can increase
the markets' efficiency." STIGLrrZ, supra note 17, at 219 (emphasis omitted).
30. II ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL 3 (1958). Schlesinger wrote:
It was now not just a matter of staving off hunger. It was a matter of seeing
whether a representative democracy could conquer economic collapse. It was a
matter of staving off violence, even (at least some so thought) revolution.
Whether revolution was a real possibility or not, faith in a free system was
plainly waning. Capitalism, it seemed to many, had spent its force ....
[VOL. 62:515
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laissez-faire capitalism. 3 1 The laissez-faire approach held that federal
government intervention should be kept to an absolute minimum
32
and, therefore, was a close corollary of the neoclassical efficiency
33
dogma that dominates law and economics today.3 4 Indeed, except in
the area of legal scholarship, the laissez-faire approach to the issue of
the law's role in structuring economic relationships and its neoclassi-
cal companion of economic efficiency have long since passed away-
at least as a matter of political reality.3 Business elites, for example,
31. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, NAT'L BuREAu OF ECON. RE-
SEARCH, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 299 (1963) (discussing
the gravity of the 1929 to 1933 economic collapse).
32. BARBER, supra note 6, at 4 (describing how the economy has traditionally been reg-
ulated "by laws of production, distribution, and exchange").
33. Professor Pouncy has described neoclassical economics, or orthodox economics,
with great clarity:
Neoclassical economics describes the economy as a state of equilibrium, in which
the forces of supply and demand interact to achieve optimal allocation of soci-
ety's resources. The focus of neoclassical economics is on the decision-making
activity of entrepreneurs, households and firms. It assumes that economic deci-
sion-making is voluntary, [perfectly] informed and rational (i.e., utility maximiz-
ing). The models used in neoclassical economics are based on transactions
occurring in exchange (i.e., barter) markets, in which perfect competition
prevails .... The market becomes the instrument of allocation, and individual
self-interested economic decisions collectively achieve an optimal societal
equilibrium.
Pouncy, supra note 26, at 540-42 (footnotes omitted).
34. Ironically, many of today's most prominent "law and economics" scholars argue in
favor of rolling back many of the pro-growth New Deal programs on efficiency grounds.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357-63 (1983) (invoking law and economics in support
of the conclusion that New Deal labor legislation "is in large measure a mistake" with no
mention of macroeconomic considerations); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett,
Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 215, 215-20, 239 (1988) (suggesting that the regulatory framework needs to be
modified so that bank depositors are exposed to financial risk because "[microeconomic]
theory suggests that depositors exposed to risk of loss will discipline excessively risky banks
... through contractual devices[,] ... higher risk premiums and... withdrawals"); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359,
2427-28 (1998) (advocating the abandonment of the current mandatory disclosure regime
of federal securities regulation in favor of a regime of "competitive federalism," with no
mention of the impact on investor confidence and no reference to macroeconomic consid-
erations). One commentator notes that, "[e]conomic orthodoxy provides the foundation
for the Law and Economics school of thought. Its key practitioners are central advocates
of imposing extreme limits on government regulation .... " Deprez, supra note 26, at 1223
(footnotes omitted). Efficiency need not be a long road to laissez-faire, but it too often is
brandished to justify a throwback to the failed economic regime of yesteryear.
35. Indeed, the inability of the neoclassical theory to account for known macroeco-
nomic phenomenon like unemployment or durable stagnation has been called a "major
scandal" of economic theory. E.g., Peter Howitt, Macroeconomics: Relations with
Microeconomics, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 394, 394 (John Eatwell
et al. eds., 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A growing body of legal scholars
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have long recognized the role of government in providing a rational-
ized business environment for facilitating economic growth and stabil-
ity.36 This political consensus that government must be massively
involved in the management of the economy has strengthened with
each passing economic trauma.
In the wake of what was recently considered a new economic par-
adigm, in which low inflation and low unemployment may co-exist in-
definitely, it is hard to comprehend the trauma of the Great
Depression. "Unemployment went from 3.2% in 1929 to 25.2% in
1933 and stayed above 10% until 1941. Real Gross National Product
plunged from $709.6 billion in 1929 to $498.5 billion in 1933. The
economy did not return to 1929 levels until 1939." Investor confi-
dence was so devastated before the New Deal that the issuance of new
corporate securities declined from $9.4 billion in 1929 to $380 million
in 1933.38
This precipitous loss of confidence caused gross domestic invest-
ment to decline more than 80% from 1929 to 1933.3' The Depression
arguably endured until just before World War II. In 1938, unemploy-
ment was still 20% and production did not exceed 1929 levels until
have thus recognized the inherent limitations, contradictions, and indeterminacy of effi-
ciency. E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies,
in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 470 (2000) (stating
that efficiency "will be radically indeterminate in the vast number of cases where there are
two available efficient rules with different distributive consequences"); Guido Calabresi,
The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1216 (1991) (question-
ing efficiency as a normative legal standard because the set of efficient "changes which
would make no one worse off and at least one person better off must ex ante be a void
set").
36. E.g., GORDON, supra note 13, at 4; see also BARBER, supra note 6, at 193 ("By 1933 a
number of business leaders who had defected from Hoover's camp.., had come to accept
much of the diagnosis offered by the dissenters from the microeconomic orthodoxy of the
1920s," in particular, "that visible hands were needed to 'balance' supply and demand in
... the economy.").
37. Professor Peter Temin maintains that the New Deal ushered in an era of demo-
cratic socialism that has waxed and waned in response to economic performance. PETER
TEMIN, LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION 134-37 (5th prtg. 1996). I agree with Profes-
sor Temin that the New Deal marked the beginning of a new system of political economy,
but would select different terminology for the dynamic because of the absence of any sig-
nificant degree of government ownership or control of productive capital. There is no
doubt that after the Great Depression government is expected to supervise and manage
the macroeconomy. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the recent need
for government intervention). I term this social supervision of the macroeconomy, "social
capitalism."
38. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with
the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1066 n.35 (1999) (cita-
tion omitted).
39. Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. REv. 429,
454 (1994).
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1941.40 Home foreclosures more than tripled from pre-Depression
levels to 1932, and by 1933 one thousand homes per day were subject
to foreclosure. 41 Home lending evaporated and construction of new
homes fell to 10% of 1929 levels;42 this was partially due to a cascade
of five thousand bank failures between 1929 and 1933, triggered by
panic-stricken depositors." Economists were at a loss to explain the
duration of the stagnation and the classical view of free markets as
inherently self-regulating suffered a fatal blow.
4 4
The numbers alone, however, do not convey the depths of de-
spair. The length and depths of the Great Depression destabilized
our democracy and the nation's basic commitment to capitalism. In
1932, a "Bonus Army" of impoverished World War I veterans, 20,000
strong, descended upon Washington, D.C. to demand early payment
of a bonus that the government had promised would be paid to the
veterans in 1945.45 President Herbert Hoover unleashed the United
States Army upon this Bonus Army causing the death of three people
(including an infant) and injuring thousands more.46 Labor unrest
proliferated. In 1934, San Francisco devolved into near "insurrection"
with 130,000 workers out on strike.4 7 Violence and bloodshed began
40. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 168. This Article takes no position on the degree to
which the New Deal immediately resolved the Great Depression, but focuses instead upon
its long-term impact. Naturally, the New Deal did not restore the speculative excesses of
the late 1920s that initially gave rise to the Depression. However, by 1935 industrial pro-
duction increased 45% over 1933 levels, factory employment was up 35%, car sales in-
creased 157%, and electric production expanded 18%. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at
San Diego Exposition (Oct. 2, 1935), in 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT 405, 410 (1938); see also Temin, supra note 37, at 100 ("It is clear that the
recovery in the United States began shortly after Roosevelt's inauguration and that it was
led by investment. It was a rapid response to the new policy regime introduced by the new
President.").
41. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message Asking for Legislation to Save Small Home Mort-
gages from Foreclosure (Apr. 13, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANK-
LIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 135, 136.
42. Id
43. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 132-33 (describing the flood of bank closings in 1933).
44. ROSENOF, supra note 9, at 8. Professor Theodore Rosenof illustrated this economic
dichotomy:
The continued descent of 1932 belied [claims] of a timely return to "normal"
conditions. Similarly, it contradicted the prevailing wisdom of the 1920s that
"business cycles" were merely oscillations within a rhythmical pattern and led to
an early readjustment via the economic "mechanism." The way was now open to
heterodox concepts and proposals, such as those advanced during the 1932 cam-
paign by Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Brains Trust."
Id
45. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 381-82 (rev. and updated
ed. 1995).
46. Id. at 382.
47. Id. at 386-87.
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to accompany foreclosures of farms and homes.4" Thirteen died as a
result of labor unrest that originated in the South Carolina textile in-
dustry.49 This unrest spread throughout the South and into New En-
gland until 421,000 workers were on strike.5 ' The Memorial Day
Massacre in Chicago took ten lives. 51 The Communist Party success-
fully organized 22,000 workers into "Unemployed Councils" in Chi-
cago alone.52 The Socialist Party garnered 884,000 votes in the
presidential election of 1932; the Communist Party received 102,000
votes.5 3 Thus, whether or not one agrees with Howard Zinn that capi-
talism "was still in 1929 a sick and undependable system," 54 many citi-
zens living in that system had that very perception.
All of this unrest somewhat predictably gave rise to a series of
demagogues and radicals. Upton Sinclair, a life long socialist, cap-
tured the Democratic nomination for Governor of California.55 He
advocated confiscating idle factories and transferring ownership to
workers.56 Senator Huey Long ultimately proposed a radical plan of
wealth redistribution, whereby "he would make 'every man a king' by
confiscating large fortunes" and guaranteeing a large income to every
family, while at the same time "promis[ing] . . . shorter working
hours. ' 7 Father Charles Coughlin, a ratings hit on 1930s talk radio,58
called for nationalizing key industries.59 Coughlin formed a political
party, The National Union for Social Justice, that attracted an esti-
mated eight million members.60 Compared to these far more radical
leaders, FDR was certainly a moderate, if not a conservative.
The genesis of the Depression had its roots in the speculative
stock market boom of the 1920s.6 1 In an efficient environment in-
cluding low transaction costs and the ability to negotiate for informa-
48. See id. at 379 (discussing a number of violent incidents prompted by foreclosures).
49. Id. at 387-88.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id. at 385.
53. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 221-22.
54. ZINN, supra note 45, at 378.
55. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 225-26.
56. Id. at 226.
57. Id. at 238. Long also promised "educational subsidies for the young, and pensions
for the elderly." Id. However, Long could only deliver on his promise of a guaranteed
income of $2500 per year by taxing to such an extent that no person could earn more than
$3000 per year. Id. at 238-39.
58. Id. at 229.
59. Id. at 232.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 34-37 (stating that "[miost ominous of all was that Hoover bluntly labeled
the 'orgy of mad speculation' that beset the stock market beginning in 1927").
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tion,6 2 the market devolved into a speculative bubble. What little
regulatory structure that did exist,63 was easily co-opted. For example,
in 1927, in the face of mounting evidence that a speculative boom was
developing, the Federal Reserve cut rates and injected more liquidity
into the market.6 4 This served only to feed the speculative frenzy, and
has been termed "'one of the most costly errors"' in the Fed's his-
tory.6 5 Conversely, in 1931, when the speculative frenzy had ceased
and the economy was in desperate need of monetary stimulus, the Fed
more than doubled the discount rate in the late fall in order to stem
the outflow of gold.6 6 It appears that the Fed was influenced by polit-
ics rather than sound policy.6 7 Economists still debate the precise
causes of the Great Depression, but all agree that the central failure
was the volume of investment-and it is clear that there were few tools
available to policymakers to counter this essential fact.68
No economist predicted the extent of the economic carnage.
Professor Irving Fisher of Yale University wrote after the 1929 crash
that "for the immediate future .. . the outlook is bright."69 The au-
62. See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE WORLD
OF ECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 211, 211 (declaring that "a capital market is said to be
efficient if it fully and correctly reflects all relevant information in determining security
prices"). There is substantial empirical support for the proposition "that if the flow of
information is unimpeded" and transaction costs are low, a high degree of efficiency may
be achieved. See id. at 211-18 (discussing various aspects of the "Efficient Market Hypothe-
sis"). Malkiel concludes, however, that "the history of fads and excesses in speculative mar-
kets . . . gives me doubts that we should always consider the current tableau of market
prices represents the best estimates available of appropriate discounted present value." Id.
at 216. Thus, the best that can be said about the efficient market hypothesis is that it often
holds true, particularly in its less strong forms. Id. at 215-16.
63. See KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 36-37 (describing the equity market landscape in the
late 1920s).
64. Id. at 35-36; see also GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 32 (asserting that the Fed was will-
fully "helpless" and could have done much to restrain the escalating bubble developing on
Wall Street).
65. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 10 (quoting Adolph C. Miller, Member, Federal Re-
serve Board, Testimony Before the Senate Committee) (internal footnote omitted).
66. BARBER, supra note 6, at 126.
67. See GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 10 (recounting that the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, in particular, had responded to pleas of foreign central bank leaders to lower
rates in order to stem the flow of capital to the United States during the 1920s).
68. See generally MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 1-20 (1987) (reviewing several theories on
the causes of the investment failure of the 1930s). Recently, economists have reached a
"new consensus" about the source of the Great Depression, specifically: "[T] hat the proxi-
mate cause of the world depression was a structurally flawed and poorly managed interna-
tional gold standard" that led to a monetary shock that contracted the world money supply.
Bernanke & Carey, supra note 19, at 853; see also TEMIN, supra note 37, at 38 (claiming that
the attempt to preserve the gold standard caused the Great Depression).
69. IRVING FISHER, THE STOCK MARKET CRASH-AND AFTER 269 (1930).
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gust Harvard Economic Society7" fared no better than Professor
Fisher. In late 1930, the Society concluded that the Depression was
nearly over when it actually was just beginning.7 In fact, it would
have been impossible to predict the extent of devastation to come; not
only was it completely unprecedented, the economic doctrine of the
day held that it could not endure for as long as it endured. 72 Presi-
dent Hoover predicted a speedy recovery. 7 President Hoover's opti-
mism, without any justifiable basis in hindsight, was not at the time
misguided. Indeed, it was President Hoover's job to be optimistic.
Mainstream economics of the day offered few tools to meet the
problems of the Depression. Economic orthodoxy held that markets
should be allowed to adjust and that wages in particular should be
allowed to fall so that a new economic equilibrium could be estab-
lished.7 ' The dogma of the day was laissez-faire. 7' The dogma of the
day also required a balanced budget, which effectively stripped the
government of fiscal policy.76 The gold standard meant that the
money supply was relatively inelastic, which stripped the government
of monetary policy.77 The gold standard was accepted without condi-
tion by most economists and the Federal Reserve, and consequently,
the money supply was linked to the nation's gold reserves. 78 Indeed,
modern theories of fiscal policy and monetary policy hardly existed.7 9
To the extent the government had such tools available, their proper
use was not well understood, as is evidenced by the botching of mone-
70. See GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 71 (describing the Harvard Economic Society).
71. Id. at 145.
72. See supra notes 9 and 44 and accompanying text (describing how contemporary
economic theory did not initially believe a depression of such magnitude was upon the
nation).
73. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 83-84 (quoting Hoover as stating in May 1930 that "'we
have now passed the worst and with continued unity of effort we shall rapidly recover'").
74. See RoSENOF, supra note 9, at 89 (noting the failure of the laissez-faire economic
approach and its "faith in private economic self-correction").
75. See id.
76. FDR castigated Hoover in the 1932 Presidential campaign for failing to balance the
budget. BARBER, supra note 6, at 192.
77. President Hoover, for example, took for granted "America's commitment to gold
convertibility at an established exchange rate." Id. This prevented the government from
engaging in "monetary manipulation" such as expanding the money supply to stimulate
growth. See id. (asserting that President Hoover would not have engaged in extensive
"monetary manipulation," even if he had such power, if it would have endangered the
value of gold).
78. BARBER, supra note 6, at 59.
79. E.g., icL at 23-27 (summarizing deficiencies in monetary policy under the pre-New
Deal Federal Reserve Board, including "considerable confusion" over monetary control
instruments and lack of control over Federal Reserve District Banks).
[VOL. 62:515
2003] LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF THE NEW DEAL AT 70 529
tary policy both before and after the market break by the Fed.8 0 Hoo-
ver's approach was largely psychological; his aim was to enhance
business confidence.8 ' Hoover's view was that "[g]overnment should
not coerce, but it could and should cajole. 8 2
Without any real tools and without any real diagnosis, economics
provided precious little insight regarding the economic breakdown.
Hoover, again reflecting the learning of the day, claimed the problem
was largely an international one that had its cause in events beyond
the control of the United States.8 3 President Hoover's Secretary of
Treasury, Andrew Mellon, counseled against any intervention and ad-
vised the President to allow the economy to "liquidate labor, liquidate
stocks, liquidate the farmers, [and] liquidate real estate."8 4 This
would allow prices to fall and markets to function in a way that would
stabilize the economy.8 5 In the end, Hoover did more than any of his
predecessors in attacking the calamity at hand. 6 He was, however,
hopelessly hemmed in by doctrine, tradition, and his own view of the
role of the federal government.8 7
In light of this fundamental confoundment, President Hoover
seems more like a person in the wrong place at the wrong time than a
conservative ideologue trapped in capitalist laissez-faire mythology.8 8
80. Phillip Cagan, Monetarism, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS, supra
note 35, at 449, 451. Furthermore, as Cagan states:
The monetarist proposition that monetary changes are responsible for business
cycles was [initially] widely contested, but by the end of the 1960s the view that
monetary policy had important effects on aggregate activity was generally ac-
cepted. The obvious importance of monetary growth in the inflation of the 1970s
restored money to the centre of macroeconomics.
Id. at 451; see also FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 686-95 (describing actions taken
by the Federal Reserve System that resulted in changes in output).
81. BARBER, supra note 6, at 80-84 (detailing efforts of President Hoover to stimulate
capital spending by business and state and local governments).
82. Id. at 82.
83. Hoover, supra note 8, at 392-93.
84. BARBER, supra note 6, at 82.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 191 (noting that "Hoover did move the federal government a considerable
distance into domains that had formerly been held to be reserved for the private sector or
for state and local authorities").
87. Id. at 190.
88. Indeed, one scholar has shown that President Hoover understood the shortcom-
ings of laissez-faire economics "better than did most of the economists in that period." Id,
at 189. Instead, Hoover was constrained by the "political and cultural environment of the
times." Id. at 190. His political view that the federal government was constitutionally lim-
ited in its ability to intervene in the private economy hamstrung federal economic policy.
Id. at 190.
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As expressed, the Great Depression was unprecedented. 9 As will be
shown, FDR's New Deal was the beginning of the modern Fed.9" Even
FDR and the Democratic Party were enamored with the dogma of a
balanced budget.9 Thus, Hoover is not to be faulted for his econom-
ics. FDR distinguished himself from Hoover not by his depth of eco-
nomic understanding, but rather by his willingness to take action, to
deviate from laissez-faire economics as a matter of federal policy, and
to experiment.92 Much of the vigor that distinguished FDR from Hoo-
ver was only possible in the wake of almost four years of unrelenting
economic meltdown.9" Before this calamity, no leader of the federal
government could have mustered the political wherewithal to support
massive government involvement in the economy.
94
All of this transformed the election of 1932 into a national refer-
endum on the role of the federal government in the economic life of
the nation.95 FDR's vision of an active government, responsible for
managing and regulating the economy,96 soundly defeated Hoover's
more hide-bound and austere role for the federal government.97 This
victory has never been repudiated, and this paper posits that laissez-
faire economics perished in the election of 1932.98 The federal gov-
89. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing how economists failed to
recognize the devastation that the Depression would bring).
90. See infra notes 174-201 and accompanying text (demonstrating the evolution of
FDR's New Deal policies into the Federal Reserve Board of today).
91. II SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 9-10 (stating that FDR adhered to the "orthodox"
view that government must maintain a balanced budget, and that one of FDR's first actions
was to cut government spending).
92. BARBER, supra note 6, at 192 (quoting FDR as promising "bold, persistent
experimentation").
93. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing how the devastation of the
Great Depression turned economic theory on its head).
94. Michael D. Bordo et al., The Defining Moment Hypothesis: The Editors' Introduction to
THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY 7 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998).
95. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 92-103 (noting that the Depression foretold Hoover's
presidential loss in 1932).
96. See infta notes 100-105 and accompanying text (describing FDR's campaign eco-
nomic promises).
97. FIONA VENN, THE NEW DEAL 22 (1998) (stating that FDR garnered 472 electoral
votes, while Hoover won only 59).
98. The birth of laissez-faire is often associated with the classical economics of Adam
Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and other early pioneers of economic thinking. See
THOMAS SOWELL, CLASSICAL ECONOMICS RECONSIDERED 20-24 (1974). However, these pio-
neers actually recognized a significant role for government within the context of a free
market economy. Id. at 21 (stating "[t]he classical economists were not rigidly opposed to
all government intervention in the market"). Indeed, the suspicion most classical econo-
mists harbored with respect to government power was rooted in recognition that "govern-
ment intervention in the economy was conceived of as intervention on behalf of the
wealthy and powerful." Id. at 23. Part II of this Article will show that the New Deal severed
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ernment's massive role in the life of our economy has instead been
institutionalized.99 Massive government presence is now a permanent
reality. The challenge to the legal system implicit in this reality is how
to rationally organize this massive presence in light of its macroeco-
nomic objectives.
II. THE LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF THE NEW DEAL
FDR broadly articulated the general economic content of his New
Deal proposals throughout the campaign of 1932.100 He rejected the
idea that an "uncontrolled" economy "ever can mean prosperity. " 101
Instead, he believed that government should dedicate itself to the
conviction that "every one of our people is entitled to the opportunity
to earn a living, and to develop himself to the fullest measure consis-
tent with the rights of his fellow men. 1 ° 2 FDR wanted to reconstitute
the structure of our economy to make that structure more "servicea-
ble" and to bring "our individual lives . .. to more perfect fulfill-
ment." ' 3 FDR rejected the theory that with time the economy would
correct itself; FDR tacitly recognized the famed John Maynard Keynes
expression that in "the long run... 'we are all dead." 04 In the end,
the New Deal was nothing less than a commitment to use the govern-
ment to forge a "better ordered system of national economy."105
FDR left plenty of maneuvering room in leaving the specifics for
later development. The very fact that the government would act be-
yond the Hoover tokenism and economic psychotherapy is what
caused Americans to elect FDR.' °6 Government management of
macroeconomic performance, widespread government regulation,
and stimulatory government expenditures had never really been tried
before in a market-based economy; 10 7 consequently, the maneuvering
monetary policy from special interest influence. Thus, government regulation or interven-
tion need not be invariably accompanied by special interest domination.
99. For example, the modern Fed is expected to manage the economy and to cool
inflationary pressures or to stimulate growth in the face of slowdowns. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a
(2000).
100. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Madison Square Garden, New York
City (Nov. 5, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 860,
860-65 (1938).
101. Id. at 861.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 862.
104. RoSENOF, supra note 9, at 20.
105. Roosevelt, supra note 100, at 864.
106. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (quoting FDR's campaign promises
for a strong economy).
107. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 376 (describing FDR's revolutionary embrace of eco-
nomic regulation during the New Deal).
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room ultimately proved helpful in terms of allowing the New Deal to
evolve in an experimental manner. Nevertheless, FDR did offer many
specific program initiatives.'0 8 FDR specifically campaigned on a plat-
form that recognized the government's power to cultivate "purchasing
power in order that goods may be sold."' ° FDR adhered to the view
that a competitive economy may mean that government regulation is
necessary, at least as a "last resort."' 0O FDR also recognized the need
for government to protect individual "rights of personal competency"
so as to allow each individual's power to be limited only by his abil-
ity.11' Finally, under FDR's vision, government is obligated to prevent
depressions112 by managing its expenditures on public works and pur-
suing countercyclical economic policies."' In all, FDR outlined a new
vision of the government's role in the economy in the election of
1932.
At the roots of FDR's vision was a skepticism regarding whether
free markets alone could assure adequate macroeconomic perform-
ance. "'14 The NIRA, for example, was nothing less than a government
effort to eliminate market competition." 5 Thus, while FDR talked
108. See infra notes 109-113 (describing FDR's economic initiatives during the campaign
of 1932).
109. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on a Program for Unemployment and
Long-Range Planning, Boston, Mass. (Oct. 31, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 842, 847.
110. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the Com-
monwealth Club, San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 755.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 756.
113. Roosevelt, supra note 109, at 850.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2000) (providing the need for the Fed's intervention in
financial systems). As the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 stated:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislo-
cation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate com-
merce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and
prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security
prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet
such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to the
burden the national credit.
Id From the point of view of today, this is no less than a stunning rebuke of laissez-faire
free markets in the financial sector. From the point of view of 1934, it was simply a reality.
115. See Seth P. Waxman, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J.
2399, 2402 (2000). Seth Waxman, the former Solicitor General of the United States, has
undertaken an excellent summary and analysis of the NIRA:
The centerpiece [of the first New Deal statutes] was the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, or NIRA. It was modeled after the country's successful economic mo-
bilization efforts during the First World War. The NIRA called for industry
representatives to create what were known as "Codes of Fair Competition." Rep-
resentatives of the oil industry, for example, would meet to establish standards
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about regulation as "a last resort," regulation was a first resort of the
New Deal, and part of the famous One Hundred Days, for those mar-
kets that had a long history of economic dysfunction.'1 6 As Justice
Breyer has stated, after the New Deal the question regarding govern-
ment regulation is not "'whether,' but 'how much."'
117
The political legacy of the New Deal regarding government re-
sponsibility for macroeconomic performance and stability has been
powerful and durable. In 1980, Ronald Reagan clearly reaffirmed the
responsibility that our political leaders bear for economic perform-
ance when he invited voters to ask a simple question: "Are you better
off than you were four years ago?"' 1 8 Bill Clinton used the same tactic
in his campaigns, which were famous for their simplistic but effective
approach: "It's the economy, stupid." 1 9 No president can today af-
ford to ignore the economy with the hope that self-regulating markets
will invariably produce politically acceptable levels of macroeconomic
performance.
To a large extent, this political reality has been institutionalized.
For example, the Federal Reserve Board exists to manage, even
micromanage, business cycles.' 2 ° Even this regulatory mechanism is a
product of the New Deal. 2 ' Similarly, the sheer presence of the fed-
eral government in our economy has expanded dramatically.12 2 In
1929, the federal government's budget consumed three percent of
GNP and by the close of the century the government accounted for
and rules regarding wages for oil workers, rates of oil production, oil prices, and
the like. The President would then review and approve each industry's Code,
thereby giving it the force of law. The NIRA also gave the President broad powers
with respect to specific industries, including, for example, the power to prohibit
the interstate transportation of oil in excess of state production limits.
Id. The NIRA was a broad-based piece of legislation, encompassing many of America's
industries. Id.
116. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing FDR's campaign for minimal
economic regulation in 1932).
117. Stephen Breyer, Afterword, 92 YALE L.J. 1614, 1614 (1983).
118. David Broder, The Social Agenda Could Spoil the Party, WASH. PosT, Nov. 23, 1980, at
C7 (internal quotation marks omitted). President Reagan was elected in response to both
economic and social pressures. Id. The social agenda included constitutional amend-
ments regarding pornography, abortion, and school prayer. Id. Reagan gave priority to
the economic agenda and largely abandoned the social agenda.
119. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Domestic Affairs, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1997, at
A29 (noting that economic performance had shielded President Clinton from the political
costs of personal scandal) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. See infra notes 180-201 (describing the evolution of the Fed's powers during the
New Deal).
121. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 367 n.7.
122. Id. at 366-70.
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twenty percent of the economy. 123 Post-New Deal, the buck stops at
the White House if the economy disappoints, whether or not the Pres-
ident bears responsibility. 124 This has created constant political pres-
sure for lawmakers to search for an ideal legal infrastructure to
support economic performance. The New Deal marks the beginning
of this search for an optimized legal infrastructure.
A. Regulatory Infrastructure
FDR made clear from the beginning of the New Deal that mod-
ern capitalism required significant regulation in order to function in a
stable and rational manner, particularly in the financial sector.125
While deeply wedded to free markets, the Great Depression con-
vinced FDR that a laissez-faire policy was no longer sustainable. 126 In
this respect, there had long been a creeping suspicion that a modern
industrialized economy was subject to bouts of ruinous market volatil-
ity; 127 indeed, even business leaders had searched throughout the
early twentieth century for a more rationalized market system.128 Lais-
sez-faire rhetoric was good politics, but business leaders had learned
from panics in 1873, 1893, 1904, 1907, and 1921, that it was terrible
economics.1
29
123. Id. at 55.
124. See ROSENOF, supra note 9, at 11 (noting that the government can no longer take a
passive role in regulating the economy).
125. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-
1940, at 41-42 (1963) (outlining FDR's initial executive actions, such as declaring a bank
holiday and treating the economic crisis as if it were a war).
126. Recently, economists have recognized the folly of deregulated financial markets in
the context of globalization. See STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 139, 183 (stating that securities
regulation and deposit insurance are critical to the success of market capitalism).
127. See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES 70-71 (4th ed.
2000) (discussing various economic crashes throughout history). As Kindleberger states:
In the United States, which was without a central bank after 1837, the major
banks in New York were in a bind between their roles as profit seekers, which
made them contributors to the instability of credit, and as possessors of country
deposits against whose instability they had to guard.
Id at 71.
128. See id. at 147-49 (discussing the establishment of clearinghouse certificates as a re-
sponse to panics, prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve System).
129. See id. at 70-71. There is also strong evidence that many innovative regulatory re-
forms from the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century ultimately benefited the pow-
erful interests that were supposedly the target of regulation. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE
TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 3
(1963); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 125, at 56-57 (discussing the influence of compa-
nies like General Motors and other powerful businessmen on the drafting on the National
Industrial Recovery Act).
[VOL. 62:515
2003] LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF THE NEW DEAL AT 70 535
No less than three major financial regulatory acts were passed as
part of the first one hundred days of the New Deal.13 ° Some of the
New Deal's first major regulatory initiatives were doomed from almost
the very beginning. One prominent example is the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act.13 This Act commanded mandatory self-regulation
of virtually all of American business.13 2 One purpose of the Act was to
regulate free markets across a wide range of products, including the
regulation of prices and output.1 33 Ultimately, the heart of the Act
was declared unconstitutional and has not formed any significant part
of the New Deal legacy.13 4 The real legacy of the New Deal's regula-
tory initiatives lies in innovations designed not to quell but to facilitate
market action, as the New Deal was fundamentally designed to do.1 35
Thus, these aspects of the New Deal were specifically designed to assist
markets to do what markets do best-allocate resources in accordance
with supply and demand and thereby unleash individual initiative.
136
1. The Securities Act of 1933137 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.13S-The key to the New Deal's approach to the Wall Street de-
bacle boils down to one word-disclosure.13 9 Disclosure would in-
spire investor confidence and investor confidence would, in turn,
revive investment. 40 The Depression decimated investment, and in-
vestment is a key component of the GDP, as well as a key source of
macroeconomic instability.4 In addition, the then recent speculative
excesses of the 1920s imposed severe macroeconomic conse-
130. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 125 and accompanying text (listing the bank bill, the
economy measure, and FDR's amendment to the Volstead Act).
131. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
132. See id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 195.
133. Id.
134. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)
(finding Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act invalid as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative law-making power).
135. See VENN, supra note 97, at 3 (characterizing the New Deal as a formalization of the
political and economic status quo rather than as a base reform measure); see also KENNEDY,
supra note 5, at 370-80 (noting the drastic increase in privately owned housing since the
New Deal).
136. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 374.
137. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2000)).
138. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1 (1933) (describing the purpose of the bill as the "full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails").
140. Id. at 1-2.
141. GORDON, supra note 20, at 38, 501-10.
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quences. 142 Congress was keenly aware that "[a] rise in the security
markets stimulates economic activity in all lines of business, a fall in
the market precipitates a decline"14 3 and that securities markets "un-
controllably accentuated natural moderate fluctuations ... into mad
booms and terrible depressions." '144 FDR similarly focused on repair-
ing and maintaining investor confidence as a means of enhancing
macroeconomic performance. 145 The federal securities laws were en-
acted with macroeconomics at the front and center of political and
public consciousness.
Thus, today, the federal securities laws impose disclosure obliga-
tions upon issuers of securities' 46 and publicly held companies, 147 and
sanction fraudulent disclosures made in connection with securities. 148
In addition, the federal securities laws impose minimum professional
obligations upon broker-dealers, a49 and these obligations also impose
truthful disclosure obligations for the benefit of customers. 150 The
theory behind the legislation was that through disclosure, inherently
unstable financial markets could be stabilized because an informed
investing public would have a high degree of confidence and panics
and bubbles could be averted.'51 Consequently, this confidence
142. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 1-5 (1934).
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. at 3. Modern economists also recognize the risks posed by unregulated finan-
cial markets. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 127, at 220-21 (stating that panics and crashes
are realities that simplistic economic theories like the efficient capital markets theory fail
to explain).
145. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (providing FDR's message to Congress on March 29,
1933). The Securities Act took specific aim at the laissez-faire approach that prevailed
prior to the New Deal. Id. at 3. Incidentally, one half of the new securities issued in the
speculative frenzy of the 1920s were ultimately of no value. Id. at 2.
146. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000) (requiring registration statements of securities to be
filed in sales or deliveries of securities through interstate commerce).
147. E.g., id. § 77j (setting forth the information that companies must include in
prospectuses).
148. E.g., id. § 78j (making it unlawful to make and use deceptive devices that have been
purchased or sold in connection to the National Securities Exchange).
149. See id. § 78h (setting forth various restrictions on brokers and dealers with respect
to borrowing and lending).
150. See id. § 78h(b) (prohibiting brokers or dealers from lending a customer's securi-
ties without prior approval from the customer); see also generally Steven A. Ramirez, The
Professional Obligations of Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U.
CIN. L. REv. 527 (2002) (providing an overview of the self-regulatory regime which imposes
professional obligations upon securities brokers).
151. In this vein, the House Report accompanying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
stated:
Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship-a
guarantee of "straight shooting"-supports the constant extension of mutual con-
fidence which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system,
easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a
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would serve to quell panics and to encourage investment as percep-
tions of market fairness increased.152 Only a perception of fairness 153
and rationality would revive and stabilize Wall Street.
154
So, how has the New Deal approach fared? 155 The federal securi-
ties laws have been a success. For six decades after their promulga-
tion, panics have largely disappeared and American capital markets
have successfully fueled the demand for start-up capital, thereby aid-
ing the economy's ability to generate continued growth through inno-
vation. 156  The market disruptions that have occurred have not
damaged the economy and have been temporary in nature. 157
prop to the stability of that system. When everything everyone owns can be sold
at once, there must be confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes
more liquid and complicated, an economic system must become more moderate,
more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting.
H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934).
152. Id.
153. See id. (emphasizing the importance of investor confidence to the stability of our
economic system); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (stating that securities markets are "fre-
quently" subject to "manipulation ... excessive speculation .... and unreasonable fluctua-
tions" causing national economic emergencies).
154. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (quoting FDR's message to Congress on March 29,
1933) (stating that truthful securities dealings should result in increased public
confidence).
155. Much debate surrounds the efficacy of the federal securities laws. However, the
period of 1935 (the first full year after the enactment of the Exchange Act) to the present
has been marked by steady economic growth. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENTr-DOLLAR AND "REAL" GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1929-2002, at www.
bea.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); see also Irwin Friend & Edward S.
Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 386 (1964) (noting that "since
the advent of the S.E.C. the stockmarket has had no debacle corresponding to that in the
early 1930's"). The empirical record is most consistent with the conclusion that the federal
securities laws have enhanced investor confidence and helped reduce the risk premiums
demanded by investors enhancing macroeconomic investment, as well as microeconomic
allocative efficiency. H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3013, 3016. Recent lessons from the shortcomings of globalization have also led econo-
mists to suggest that sound securities regulation is critical regulatory infrastructure for the
success of free markets. STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 139. Compare George J. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37J. Bus. 117, 124 (1964) (asserting that "studies suggest
that the S.E.C. registration requirements had no important effect on the quality of new
securities sold to the public"), with Friend & Herman, supra, at 389 (expressing doubt over
whether "any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stock-market prac-
tices between the pre- and post-S.E.C. periods could lament or underrate the success of the
new legislation in eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets").
156. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679 (stating that
"[tihe United States securities markets are the most liquid and deep in the world . . .
[which is] . . . largely the result of a high level of investor confidence in the integrity and
efficiency of our markets").
157. See Market Reform Act of 1989:]. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 8 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gramm)
(noting that the market shock of October 19, 1987 did not damage the economy).
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America's financial system has served as a model for the world. 5 '
Nothing like the terrible speculation and subsequent crash of the
1920s has ever stricken Wall Street since the New Deal. 15 9 Here, Con-
gress seems to have rejected notions of laissez-faire efficiency in favor
of establishing "fair" markets in order to inspire investment and en-
hance macroeconomic performance. 161 Congress, for one, has long
been a constant supporter of federal securities regulation. 161 Each
time Congress materially amended the securities laws, it reaffirmed
this goal. 16 2 Even recently, when Congress restricted investor rights
158. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Remarks at 22d Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan.
25, 1995), in 1 SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW
SECURITIES LAW 300, 304 (1996) (explaining that "[o]ur markets are the best in the world,
partly because our securities laws are the best in the world"); Gerhard Wegen, Congratula-
tions from Your Continental Cousins, lOb-5: Securities Fraud Regulation from the European Perspec-
tive, 61 FoRDnAM L. REV., S57, S74 (1993) (inviting Rule 10b-5 to "visit" both Western and
Eastern Europe); Going for the Golden Egg, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 89-90 (stating that
"America has been much better than Europe at hatching small firms" and detailing Euro-
pean efforts to imitate American securities markets).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (stating that between 1920 and 1930 about one-
half of the $50 billion of new securities issued were "worthless"); I Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 216 n.124 (Aspen Law & Bus. 3d ed., vol. 1998) (1951)
(noting that new securities issues increased six-fold between 1933 and 1935 and over ten-
fold between 1933 and 1936).
160. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000) (stating that trading in securities is "affected with a
national public interest" demanding the maintenance of "fair and honest markets" because
unfair markets can lead to "national emergencies" resulting in "widespread unemploy-
ment" and "dislocation of trade").
161. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013,
3016. The House Report stated:
The Securities Act of 1933, relating to truthful disclosure of information about
new securities offerings; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, relating to disclo-
sure of information about listed securities and regulating practices in exchange
and over-the-counter operations; and succeeding legislation which is adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, represent legislation of which
this committee and the Congress are justly proud. These statutes have gone a
long way in the mitigation and elimination of undesirable practices in the securi-
ties field, in the restoration of confidence in securities markets, and in the protec-
tion of the investing public.
162. Congress has emphasized investor protection and investor confidence as an impor-
tant, even compelling, policy objective. H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 43-44 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 220-222; see also S. REp. No. 91-1218, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5256 (stating that the purpose of the amendment to S. 2348 is "[t]o
provide greater protection for customers of registered brokers and dealers and members
of national securities exchanges"); H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 6-7 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3019-20 (demonstrating congressional determination to maintain in-
vestor protection). In fact, each of the above legislative reports relates to legislation specif-
ically designed to enhance the investor protection elements of the federal securities laws.
See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (expanding SEC oversight of self-regulatory
organizations that supervise broker-dealers); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636, 1637 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111
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under the federal securities laws,' 6 3 in response to special interest
pressure,1 6 4 the fundamental disclosure obligations imposed by the
New Deal remained intact,"' as did Congress's commitment to pro-
tecting investor confidence. 166 "It is a basic teaching of this nation's
financial history that continued economic health fundamentally de-
pends upon the maintenance of investor confidence."'"67 From a
macroeconomic point of view, investor confidence is central to stimu-
lating investment and hence maximizing GDP; ' 6 8 microeconomic
views of the federal securities laws often fail to even mention such
considerations1 69 or even the term "investor confidence."' 70 In the
end, these regulatory acts lowered the cost of capital and stabilized
financial markets.
2. The Banking Act of 1933 and the Banking Act of 1935.-The
prostrate banking industry was nearly brain dead in 1933 under condi-
tions of laissez-faire efficiency. 171 The New Deal attacked the laissez-
faire devastation on several fronts. The most durable elements of the
(2000)) (establishing the Securities Investor Protection Corporation); Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 565 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (extending the regulatory power of the federal securities laws
and the SEC to over-the-counter markets).
163. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) (re-
forming private litigation claims for suits arising under the Securities Act of 1933).
164. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 38, at 1087 n.156 (showing special interest influence in
the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
165. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 746
(setting forth that auditors are required to disclose fraud by their corporate clients).
166. In fact, according to the Statement of Managers in the Conference Report accom-
panying the PSLRA, "Congress has been prompted by significant evidence of abuse in pri-
vate securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect investors and maintain confidence in
our capital markets." Id at 31.
167. H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 43-44.
168. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control 111 YALE L.J. 1, 64-65 (2001) (stating that empirical
data "does fairly suggest that securities markets cannot grow or expand to their full poten-
tial under a purely voluntary legal regime" and that mandatory law is needed to stem mar-
ket "crashes").
169. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1023, 1028-34 (2000) (discussing the benefits of the mandatory disclosure require-
ment of the federal securities laws and failing to link "vague notions of investor confi-
dence" to macroeconomic performance).
170. See Romano, supra note 34, at 2427-28 (arguing against any mandatory federal dis-
closure regime for securities but neglecting to discuss investor confidence).
171. See VENN, supra note 97, at 24 (noting that "[b]y the time of [Roosevelt's] inaugura-
tion, the governors of 34 states had closed their states' banks, leaving millions of Americans
facing the prospect of coping without access to money").
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New Deal reforms were federal deposit insurance and the perfection
of modern monetary policy. 172
a. Modern Monetary Policy.-The innovation of modern mon-
etary policy, complete with a high degree of political independence
for the Federal Reserve Board, is a key element of macroeconomic
infrastructure. The legacy of the New Deal here is twofold: the crea-
tion of the modern Fed and the elimination of a money supply rigidly
limited by the Gold Standard.'73
Originally, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of
the Currency, both executive officers, served on the Fed, but the
Banking Act of 1933' terminated their membership.'7 5 The Bank-
ing Act of 1933 also set the tenure of the Fed governors at twelve to
fourteen years,176 and further centralized the control of monetary pol-
icy in the Board. 1 77 The purpose of the Banking Act of 1933 was to
endow the Fed with more political insulation so that it could exercise
its control over monetary policy in a way that represented the "general
public interest" and did not operate in accordance with "a majority of
special interests. ' 17' The Banking Act was an essential part of FDR's
economic recovery plan and he intervened personally to assure its pas-
sage. 17' The Banking Act represents the commencement of the Fed's
modern existence in that the Banking Act definitively vested monetary
policy in the Fed and assured that the Fed was endowed with a high
degree of independence.
Due to the New Deal, the Fed is also now remarkably indepen-
dent of the appropriations process. The Fed has the power to assess
member banks to supply funds for its operating expenses.1 t ° In 1933,
Congress declared these funds not to be "[g] overnment funds or ap-
propriated moneys."' 8 ' As a result, the expenditure of these funds is
172. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 12 (discussing the impact of the Trea-
sury and the Federal Reserve System after 1936).
173. See KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 136, 274 (relaying some of the positive effects of mon-
etary policy).
174. Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-1832 (2000)).
175. Id. § 6, 48 Stat. at 166.
176. Id. § 6, 48 Stat. at 166-67.
177. See, e.g., id. § 8, 48 Stat. at 168 (creating the Federal Open Market Committee,
which partly consists of members of the Board, and whose functions include regulating
open-market operations for all Federal Reserve Banks).
178. H.R. REP. No. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935).
179. See JEFFREY WORSHAM", OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 45 (1997) (explaining that
"[p] residential intervention was instrumental to secure passage of the [Banking] act").
180. 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2000).
181. Id. § 244.
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essentially free of congressional oversight.'8 2 Similarly, the Fed has
the power to determine freely the compensation of its employees with-
out being restricted by government service pay scales.18 3 All of this
insulation from political influence has prompted Professor Alfred
Aman to state that "[t]he Fed is one of the most powerful and inde-
pendent federal agencies engaged in economic regulation."' 8 4 This
may be somewhat of an understatement; the Fed is the only regulatory
agency that is totally self-funded and free from the appropriations pro-
cess.1 85 Occasionally, the Fed has been subject to government budget-
ary review and audit,'8 6 but the general rule is that it need not
annually submit its budget to Congress for approval. 8 7
The reasons why Congress created the Fed and endowed it with
such extraordinary independence and power seem clear. The pri-
mary reason given for the Federal Reserve Act of 1913"88 was to "fur-
nish an elastic currency."8 9 Although modern economic theory
associates money supply manipulation with monetary policy,1 9 ° in
1913 an "elastic currency" referred to a more basic economic need. 9 1
Specifically, Congress was far more concerned with "seasonal" cur-
rency needs and the mobility of reserves (or liquidity) to meet the
182. See id. §§ 243-244 (granting to the Fed the power to decide how to spend the
money collected from member banks).
183. See id. § 243 (allowing the Fed to assess member banks as a means of funding the
salaries of Fed employees).
184. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of
Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REv. 837, 838-39 (1989); see also JOHN T.
WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS OF MONETARY PO-
icy 1 (1984) (identifying the Federal Reserve as the highest ranked institution among pow-
erful governmental institutions).
185. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 1999 app. 1165 (1998) (stating that the Fed's operations are not included in
the budget and its budget is not reviewed by the President).
186. See ACCOUNTING & INFO. MGMT. DIV., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REp. No.
GAO/AIMD-96-5, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: INTERNAL CONTROL, ACCOUNTING, AND AUDIT-
ING ISSUES (1996) [hereinafter GAO REP.] (reporting the results of a GAO audit of the
Dallas Federal Reserve Bank).
187. See 12 U.S.C. § 244. The Government Accounting Office has reviewed the Federal
Reserve's operations. See Fed Chief Takes Exception to GAO's Critical Report, WALL ST. J., Apr.
17, 1996, at C22 (reporting Chairman Greenspan's response to the GAO report finding
that the Fed suffered from lax internal controls); see also GAO REP., supra note 186; John R.
Wilke, Showing Its Age: Fed's Huge Empire, Set Up Years Ago, Is Costly and Inefficient, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 1996, at Al (summarizing the GAO's findings of budgetary excesses at the Fed).
188. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at various
sections of 12 U.S.C. (2000)).
189. H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 1 (1913).
190. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 533 (discussing change in the intellectual
climate and political opinions regarding government intervention in economic activity
post-1929).
191. See id. at 189-96.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cyclical agricultural demand for money. 192 These seasonal disruptions
in currency demand caused panics and bank runs that, in turn, trig-
gered severe economic contractions in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, 1896,
and 1907.' By the time of the passage of the Banking Act of 1935,
Congress explicitly understood the relationship between money sup-
ply and output and re-conceived the Fed's role from mere currency
"accommodation" to protector of "business stability.19 4 The indepen-
dence Congress extended to the Fed must be viewed as a recognition
of the dangers of political influence over monetary policy. Commenta-
tors have long demonstrated that politicians face an irresistible urge
to inflate currencies for political gain.
19 5
With respect to the gold standard, the New Deal took important
steps to allow the money supply to expand independently from the
nation's gold supply. The abandonment of the gold standard was en-
acted as part of the one hundred days, on April 19, 1933.196 This in-
novation thereby freed the money supply from the shackles of the
gold standard. Combined with the reform of the Fed, the New Deal
secured a depoliticized monetary policy mechanism, one which has
served to stabilize economic growth throughout the post-World War II
era. 197
So, how has the New Deal's creation fared? According to the vast
majority of mainstream commentators, it has been an unconditional
success.' 98 While the modern Fed has certainly had its critics, there
seems to be little doubt that the pre-New Deal Fed was dominated by
narrow, short-sighted special interests that exercised power to exacer-
192. See H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 5-6 (recognizing the immediate currency needs of the
financial and business world at that time); see also FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at
192 (discussing the need for cyclical liquidity).
193. See H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 3-4 (discussing the general background of banking and
currency that called for H.R. 7837).
194. H.R. REP. No. 74-742, at 9 (1935).
195. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 433, 436-45 (1998) (discussing the rent-extraction motivation for inflation).
196. II SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 20.
197. See supra note 155 (detailing the tracking of GDP by Bureau of Economic Affairs).
198. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 503, 553 (2000) ("The historical and empirical record suggests that the Fed has not
exercised its power over monetary policy for the benefit of special interests."). This is not
to say that the Fed is completely insensitive to politics. No organ of American government
is immune from political pressure. Id. at 545-46; see also Tony Caporale & Kevin B. Grier, A
Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate, 41 J.L. & ECON.
409, 423 (1998) (finding that Presidents and Congressional leaders may influence whether
monetary policy is restrictive or expansionary, but not showing any indication of special
interest influence).
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bate the Depression.' 99 Even former President Hoover praised the
modern Fed for its "many excellencies" in managing monetary pol-
icy.200 Today, it would be inconceivable to have modern economy
without monetary policy and the accompanying legal "infrastructure"
needed to assure political independence.2 °' The creation of a politi-
cally independent monetary authority, within the bounds of the Con-
stitution, is exemplary of the power of the law to further
macroeconomic ends.
b. Deposit Insurance.Z0 2 -Congress created the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in order to stem the massive dis-
intermediation caused by a cascade of bank failures in the early
1930s.213 Panics were pervasive and bank runs were proliferating.
20 4
Deposit insurance was designed to make bank deposits as safe as gov-
ernment bonds in order to stem bank runs and protect communities
from the economic shock of bank failures.20 5 The aim was to restore
depositor confidence to prevent the withdrawal of funds from the
199. Scholars have found that under this regime, the Fed allowed the interests of the
banking industry to dominate monetary policy-even to the extent of causing tight mone-
tary policies in the depths of the Great Depression, which greatly exacerbated that calam-
ity. See Gerald Epstein & Thomas Ferguson, Monetary Policy, Loan Liquidation and Industrial
Conflict: The Federal Reserve and the Open Market Operations of 1932, 44J. ECON. HIST. 957, 982-
83 (1984) (concluding that the Fed tightened money supply in 1932 to 1933 to enhance
bank profits from government securities while disregarding the detrimental effect on the
rest of the economy).
200. U.S. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOV'T, THE HOOVER COMMIS-
SION REPORT App. N at 109 (1949) [hereinafter HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT].
201. Jerry L. Jordan, Hayekian Economic Infrastructure as a Foundation for Sustained Prosper-
ity, 19 CoNTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 20, 26 (2001) (stating that "economic infrastructure plays a
major role in determining economic prosperity" and that the ideal infrastructure includes
a credible monetary authority).
202. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (2000)). The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), a savings and loan corollary to the FDIC, was formed in 1934. National Housing
Act, ch. 847, § 402, 48 Stat. 1255, 1256 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1724).
203. See Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Criti-
cal Analysis of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALEJ. ON REG. 145, 146 (1984) (stating that "[d] eposit
insurance acts as a stabilizer by preventing bank runs and the dangerous reduction in the
nation's money supply that large scale bank failures can cause" and that its "major justifica-
tion" rests on "macroeconomic grounds" (footnote omitted)).
204. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 132-33.
205. Congressman Steagall commented during a debate on deposit insurance:
[Tlhe purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the United States in
the right to have banks in which their deposits will be safe. They have a right to
expect of Congress the establishment and maintenance of banks in the United
States where citizens may place their hard earnings with reasonable expectation
of being able to get them out again upon demand.
77 CONG. REc. 3837, 3840 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall).
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206banking system. Once deposits returned freely to the banking sys-
tem, liquid assets could be transformed into loans so as to unleash
consumption and investment supported by bank loans. 2°7 Bank fail-
ures, thus, had macroeconomic consequences because failures would
result in a contraction of the money supply.2°s
Of course, the presence of federally guaranteed deposit insur-
ance also lowered the cost of funds for insured banks.2 9 FDR stated
that the purpose was not just "to protect depositors, but to make more
serviceable the whole banking system. ''210  This in turn, would en-
hance the ability of the banks to fund economic expansion. 211 Simi-
larly, because panic-induced runs ultimately threaten even sound
banks, the presence of deposit insurance relieves the entire industry
of the need to maintain protective reserves to guard against deposit
demands arising from problems associated with competitor banks.212
The New Deal abolished macroeconomically significant bank
runs as a result of this regulatory innovation.2 13 Deposit insurance
also greatly reduced the relative frequency of bank failures.214 Econo-
206. Helen A. Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market Disci-
pline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 250 n.40 (1988) (noting the desirability of having a stable
banking system).
207. Congress passed the 1933 provisions "[i]n order to provide against a repetition of
the present painful experience in which a vast sum of assets and purchasing power is 'tied
up.'" S. REP. No. 73-77, at 12 (1933).
208. See Kenneth E. Scott & Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals
for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857, 858-59 (1971) (discussing the ef-
fects of deposit insurance in terms of macroeconomics).
209. Marie T. Reilly, The FDIC as Holder in Due Course: Some Law and Economics, 1992
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 165, 200 (discussing the FDIC's ability to pool risk and therefore
lower cost).
210. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Letter and Statement Formulating a Plan to Admit Non-
Member State Banks to the Deposit Insurance Fund from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jesse
Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Oct. 23, 1933), in 2 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 433, 437.
211. See Scott & Mayer, supra note 208, at 858-59 (asserting that uninsured bank failures
would sharply reduce U.S. money supply).
212. See id. at 859, 867 (stating that even sound banks are subject to debilitating runs
and noting that failures come in groups so that large reserves are needed just when times
are adverse).
213. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 366 (noting that bank failures dropped from a rate of
hundreds per year before the Depression to less than ten per year after 1933).
214. Macey & Garrett, supra note 34, at 215 (showing that the number of bank failures
after the advent of deposit insurance did not reach 1933 levels for over fifty years). One
commentator has remarked: "The deposit insurance system turned out... to be one of the
most brilliant and successful of the accomplishments of the Hundred Days." II SCHLES-
INGER, supra note 30, at 443 (noting that total bank failures for the period of 1934 to 1940
were less than any year during the 1920s and no more than 8% of the total from 1933).
Others have stated that "[a]ll in all, government deposit insurance is a brilliant solution to
a very difficult problem." Scott & Mayer, supra note 208, at 867.
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mists from Milton Friedman to John Kenneth Galbraith have re-
marked upon the success of the FDIC.21 5 It is certainly the case that
in the 1980s and 1990s a massive wave of failures hit the banking in-
dustry.21 6 I have previously explained that this was a direct result of ill-
conceived neoclassical calls for deregulation and a pervasively irra-
tional regulatory environment.2 17 Indeed, even as early as 1985, in-
dustry insiders were calling for "enhance [ed] bank supervision" in the
wake of deregulation of bank powers.2 18
It is also the case that neoclassical theorists continue to maintain
that deposit insurance should be rolled back so that depositors can
exercise discipline over excessively risky banks. As Professor Garten
has shown, however, any theoretical argument that depositors have
sufficient resources and expertise to impose discipline on banks can-
not be squared with reality.2 19 First, most depositors will control risks
through easier methods than analyzing the level of risk a bank is ex-
posed to, including simply keeping lower balances in the banking sys-
tem.22' This would have serious macroeconomic consequences, as
FDR's goal of strengthening the banking system to fuel growth would
be undermined, particularly in bad times.2 2 ' Second, Professor Gar-
ten has shown that the neoclassical claims that depositors can be em-
pirically shown to exert discipline over bank managers are logically
inconsistent, because such evidence only shows that deposit insurance
has not eliminated market discipline. 222 In sum, in a world of infinite
distractions there is little reason to think that depositors will pay atten-
tion unless events trigger wholesale panic; this was precisely the reality
that FDR faced when deposit insurance was enacted. 22 3 Such a reality
is macroeconomically unsound. Mainstream macroeconomists now
recognize the risk that mass bank failures, by reducing buying power
215. William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Indus-
try, 1 YALEJ. ON REG. 195, 198 (1984).
216. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503,
564-70 (2000).
217. Id. at 567-68.
218. Goodman & Shaffer, supra note 203, at 149. Both Goodman and Shaffer earned
Ph.Ds from Stanford University. Id. at 145. Goodman became a Senior Economist with
Citibank, while Shaffer became a Senior Economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Id.
219. Garten, supra note 206, at 248.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 241.
223. See Scott & Mayer, supra note 208, at 860 (commenting that "[t]he only practicable
way the small depositor can find out that a depository institution is unsafe is to have it
suspend payment, and by that time it is too late"). Depositors cannot detect frauds or
evaluate financial information at a reasonable cost. Id.
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and contracting the money supply, pose to macroeconomic perform-
ance.224 Thus, the law and macroeconomics of the New Deal again
served to endow our economy with a critical part of an optimized reg-
ulatory infrastructure.
B. Social Infrastructure
Social unrest can lead to political instability. This in turn can
lead to economic instability as political risks become manifest.225 This
implies a higher cost of capital and therefore macroeconomic con-
traction. Similarly, social fear can lead to a loss of confidence, a drag
on consumption and trigger a credit-crunch (or a liquidity trap),
which in turn leads to macroeconomic contraction. 226 A socially se-
cure consumer is a consumer ripe for maximum exploitation by entre-
preneurs and business people. Therefore, government should
provide social conditions that curb political instability, protect citizens
from exogenous sources of fear, and support a prosperous and secure
consumer.
1. Social Security Act.-One of the most durable and significant
elements of the New Deal was the Social Security Act.227 Like many
New Deal initiatives the Social Security Act was challenged constitu-
224. See Galbraith, supra note 4, at 191-92 (stating that deposit insurance remedied a
"grievous defect" of laissez-faire economics and that "[r]arely has so much been accom-
plished by a single law"); GORDON, supra note 20, at 221 (explaining the causes of the Great
Depression and concluding that "after September 1931, the [macroeconomic] contraction
was caused mainly by monetary factors, including the enormous loss of lifetime savings in
bank failures").
225. Neoclassicists recognize that the market does not correctly price political risk. See
Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283, 312-13
(1998). Investors have a difficult time assessing political risk. Id. at 286. Thus, the govern-
ment's ability to stem such risk will enhance economic performance. See Michael K.
Young, Lessons From the Battle Front: U.S.-Japan Trade Wars and Their Impact on the Multilateral
Trading System, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 753, 761 n.16 (2001) (describing political
stability as an important prerequisite to the continued growth of the U.S. economy).
226. When actors are exceedingly pessimistic about economic prospects, an expansive
monetary policy fails to lead to output gains because both consumption and investment are
stilted by the belief that prices will decline if expenditures are deferred. Or, investors can
become so risk averse that money balances remain high despite interest rate cuts. In such
a context, monetary policy can become impotent. Indeed, according to a well-known ver-
nacular, trying to stimulate an economy through monetary policy alone can be like "push-
ing on a string." GORDON, supra note 20, at 213-14, 565. Thus, monetary policy cannot
always be a trusted means to stem economic instability. The New Deal, as previously men-
tioned, marks the birth of monetary policy.
227. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 620, 623 (1935). Today,
Social Security remains a hot political topic. Jonathan Barry Forman, Federal Tax Policy in
the New Millennium: Universal Pensions, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 95, 110 (1999). However, it is note-
worthy that no politician has openly called for the abolition of the system.
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tionally and like many of the New Deal's most prominent long-term
successes it survived the challenge.2 28 In part, this reflects the death
knell of judicial laissez-faire, which corresponds to the economic, po-
litical, and social death of laissez-faire during the same era.
229
FDR signed the Social Security Act into law with the aim of en-
hancing macroeconomic stability.2 3 ° The Act provided unemploy-
ment insurance, pensions for retired workers, aid to dependent
children, and other social insurance programs. 231 To FDR, the Act
consequently created a "cornerstone" in a "structure" that was specifi-
cally designed to diffuse any depressions that might arise in the fu-
ture.23 2 The Act was not just about "human needs" but also about
placing the American economy upon a firm foundation.2 3 Certainly,
assuring that workers had an income stream during periods of unem-
ployment would stimulate consumption in times of economic
hardship.
Nevertheless, there were other macroeconomic objectives to So-
cial Security. For instance, government can raise the propensity of
consumers to consume by placing them on a more secure economic
footing.23 4 Moreover, the Act also would encourage workers to exit
the workforce upon reaching retirement age. 23 5 This would shrink
the labor pool and raise wages, allowing business to tap an enhanced
pool of potential consumption to fuel profitability and innovation.
2 36
228. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583, 585 (1937) (upholding a
tax imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935 because its impositions "con-
form [ed] to the canon of uniformity" required by the Constitution); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (stating that the scheme of social security benefits created by the
provisions of Tide II of the Social Security Act of 1935 did not reach past the limitations
imposed by the Tenth Amendment).
229. See William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937-Was There
a "Switch in Time"?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1347, 1347 (2000) (stating that the "judicial doctrine of
laissez-faire" was the "victim" of the Supreme Court's change in judicial philosophy and it
has never resurfaced).
230. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement upon Signing the Social Security Act
(Aug. 14, 1935), in 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, supra





234. Raising the propensity to consume is a central tenet of Keynesian economics, which
emphasizes government expenditures as a means of mitigating the drag on the economy
caused by foregone consumption. See GORDON, supra note 13, at 272 ("Haphazardly and
... ineffectively, the SSA reflected long-standing business concerns. Retailers and con-
sumer-goods firms hoped to buttress aggregate demand.").
235. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 371.
236. Id.
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The federal Social Security Act also was an effort by the business com-
munity to eliminate cut-throat competitors (i.e., those having the abil-
ity to avoid providing security to employees) and to eliminate
inconsistent state laws.23 7 Thus, Social Security would operate to cre-
ate more secure, confident, and prosperous consumers-even in good
times. It also allowed business the ability to operate in a more ra-
tional environment by smoothing out inter-state differences and giv-
ing businesses the ability to pay fairer wages without fear that other
competitors would undercut the more progressive employers. 23 9 In
fact, a key Senate supporter stated that the "chief merit" of the Social
Security System is the "stabilization of industry. 24 °
Has it worked? William Leuchtenberg has concluded that the bill
was so pro-business that it was "an astonishingly inept and conservative
piece of legislation. '241  This may be so, but the focus of this Article
concerns the government's ability, under law, to foster macroeco-
nomic growth, not further any liberal goals.24 2 On the macroeco-
nomic front, the Act most certainly socialized the costs of
unemployment and old age and removed those burdens from the
shoulders of business, state law notwithstanding. 243 There is also little
doubt that Social Security contributed to rising wage levels, as in-
tended.244 To this extent, then, Social Security was an economic suc-
cess. It was also a success to the extent that the laissez-faire
microeconomic prediction that Social Security would destroy individ-
ual initiative proved to have no basis in reality. 245 Given the perform-
237. GORDON, supra note 13, at 271.
238. The enhancement of buying power was a cornerstone of the New Deal. See supra
note 109 and accompanying text (noting FDR's campaign platform of the government's
authority to cultivate purchasing power).
239. "The SSA... was, in essence, a business bill.... The SSA ... reflected the efforts
of [business] to rationalize disparate experiments in state and private welfare and to
spread the costs of these experiments among all competing states and firms." GORDON,
supra note 13, at 278-79.
240. GORDON, supra note 13, at 279.
241. LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 125, at 132.
242. The advent of the Social Security payroll tax in 1937 created a $2 billion fiscal drag
and, according to some commentators, triggered a sharp recession in 1937. KENNETH S.
DAVIs, FDR THE NEW DEAL YEARs 1933-1937, at 523 (3d ed. 1986).
243. Paula E. Berg, Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in
Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 34 n.168 (1999) (citing social security
laws as an example of legal provisions that socialize costs).
244. The Social Security Act promoted stability by imposing "obligatory retirement by
age sixty-five, statutorily shr[inking] the size of the labor pool and therefore, reduc[ing]
wage competition." KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 371.
245. Conservatives attacked Social Security on familiar neoclassical grounds by stating:
"[It would discourage thrift, encourage shiftlessness, destroy individual initiative, and in
general raise hell with the moral character of the citizenry." DAvis, supra note 242, at 461.
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ance of the economy before Social Security and its performance
since,246 there is no evidence that any of these dire predictions have
transpired. Finally, the Act does appear to both encourage early re-
tirement and enhance the propensity to consume, each of which has
positive macroeconomic impact by diminishing unemployment and
stimulating consumption.247
2. The Wagner Act (The National Labor Relations Act).24 8-The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), another New Deal innovation,
rests on an explicit recognition that capitalism works best when capi-
talists have the ability to exploit a prosperous consumer base. Bill
Gates can sell more software on the North Shore of Chicago than in
Bangladesh. When sponsor Senator Robert Wagner introduced the
NLRA in 1935, he explicitly stated that the NLRA was designed to
create a vibrant middle class, with higher wages, as a means of stimu-
lating economic growth. 249 The role of income distribution in eco-
nomic performance is still controversial today25 ° and was controversial
246. See supra note 155 (detailing the tracking of the GDP by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis).
247. Dorothy A. Brown et al., Social Security Reform: Risks, Returns, and Race, 9 CORNELLJ.
L. & PUB. POL. 633, 653 n.102 (2000) (illustrating that Social Security encourages early
retirement and enhances consumption by diminishing savings).
248. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)). Another important legacy of the New Deal is the changes in
constitutional doctrine left in its wake. An important part of those doctrinal changes is the
result of constitutional challenges to the Wagner Act. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). In the course of these cases, the Court stated: "Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or ap-
propriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control." Id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
128-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 against the challenge
that federal power to regulate commerce did not extend to a farmer who produced and
consumed wheat he never marketed); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941)
(upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to the hours and wages
of workers in a Georgia lumberyard, whose operations were exclusively intrastate).
249. 79 CONG. REc. 7572 (1935) (address by Sen. Wagner introducing the National La-
bor Relations Act, May 15, 1935). Senator Wagner explained:
When wages sink to low levels, the decline in purchasing power is felt upon the
marts of trade. And since collective bargaining is the most powerful single force
in maintaining and advancing wage rates, its repudiation is likely to intensify the
maldistribution of buying power, thus reducing standards of living, unbalancing
the economic structure, and inducing depression with its devastating effect upon
the flow of commerce.
Id.
250. See, e.g., FOLKE DOVRING, INEQUALIY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCOME DIsTRIBu-
TION 146-48 (1991) (arguing that the United States should take a more active role in
achieving full employment).
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in the past as a suspected cause of the Great Depression. 5' Separate
and apart from the macroeconomic impact of income distribution,
even conservative business voices recognize the economic desirability
of a prosperous middle class to support a prosperous consumer
base.252
A second goal of the NLRA was to quell rising labor unrest.253
Much violence accompanied labor relations in the era of laissez-
faire. 25 4 As Dean Verkuil has highlighted, the NLRA was enacted at a
time when "labor-management relations and the economy were at a
low ebb. '255 Moreover, "[t]here were strikes and violence which,
according to historical reports, amounted to civil war in many com-
munities."256 This industrial unrest undoubtedly disrupted macro
economic output.
257
Congress attacked the problems of labor unrest and income ine-
quality by imposing a mandatory scheme of collective bargaining, as a
matter of federal law. 25' The central provisions of the NLRA are sec-
251. SeeSHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK, AMERICA UNEQUAL 1-14 (1995) (show-
ing that income inequality is greater now than at any time other than immediately before
the Great Dcpression).
252. Does Inequality Matter?, Economist, June 16, 2001, at 9 (arguing that the elimination
of poverty is more important than the elimination of income or wealth inequality). In
popular historical accounts from the era immediately following the Depression, inequality
figured prominently as a suspected cause. E.g., ALLAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER,
A POCKET HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 415 (9th rev. ed. 1992).
253. The drafters of the NLRA found that the economic consequences of poor labor
relations were significant, including:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers ...
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competi-
tive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (internal numbering omitted).
254. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (describing the violence and blood-
shed associated with labor unrest in the early 1930s).
255. Paul R. Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Relations?, 92 YALE L.J. 1409, 1409
(1983).
256. Id.; see Paul Weiler, Striking New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 370 (1984) (noting that labor strikes are costly and
may lead to unacceptable losses in output and employment).
257. Weiler, supra note 256, at 370.
258. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). The Fair Labor Standards Act also supported this goal by
imposing a minimum wage, limiting working hours, and abolishing child labor. Id. §§ 206,
207, 212. These actions are consistent with a well-ordered scheme of social capitalism, and
probably have had positive macroeconomic effect. Nevertheless, because the Act sought to
impose market outcomes directly, instead of facilitate market action, it transcends the fo-
cus of this Article, which posits that the main thrust of the New Deal was to create an
environment to unleash markets. In this respect, the Act is much like the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. See supra note 20 (discussing the use of government-created infrastructure
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tions 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), which make it an unfair labor practice for
an employer or a union to "refuse to bargain collectively." '25 9 Section
8(d) defines collective bargaining as a "mutual obligation" for both
employer and employee representatives to "meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. ' 260 As could be expected, these gen-
eral statutory terms have given rise to a complex body of interpretative
case law.26 1
Professor Paul Verkuil's conclusion is that the NLRA was "a suc-
cessful attempt to mediate among competing social values in a time of
unprecedented upheaval. '26 2 As of 1983, the NLRB was handling
over 60,000 cases annually. 263 Thus, the New Deal brought industrial
peace with the NLRA.26 4 Other commentators go much further. His-
torian David Kennedy states that the NLRA shifted labor conflict from
the streets to hearing rooms. 26 5 Labor unrest after the NLRA "largely
disappeared" from the American economic landscape.2 6 6 Moreover,
while income distribution may not have changed dramatically since
the Great Depression, certainly the NLRA's goal of increasing
worker buying power has been achieved.2 68 As Kennedy highlights,
"[u] nions made a difference" on this point, as wages for union work-
ers rose "in measurably greater degree than in unorganized
sectors.
26 9
3. The Tennessee Valley Authority.2 70-Joe W. McCaleb has summa-
rized well the plight of the South before the New Deal:
to enhance the free market). I take no position in this Article on the circumstances that
justify government action to directly change market outcomes, as opposed to enhancing
market action in a macroeconomically significant way. Thus, for example, deposit insur-
ance changed one element of a typical bank transaction; it thus facilitated innumerable
deposits into banks.
259. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
260. Id. § 158(d).
261. See generally DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAw (2000) (providing in-depth coverage of
labor jurisprudence).
262. Verkuil, supra note 255, at 1410.
263. Id. at 1414.
264. Id.
265. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 320.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 364. However, economistJohn Kenneth Galbraith has explained that by the
19 50s the distribution of income had improved. GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at 191.
268. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 320.
269. Id. Macroeconomists generally credit the New Deal and the NLRA in particular,
with raising hourly wages. GORDON, supra note 20, at 222.
270. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a corporate body created by the Act of Congress
of May 18, 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.).
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In the 1930's, the South was a poverty-stricken section of
America that had escaped the wealth accumulated in other
regions of the country. In 1933, for 'example, the per capita
income in the Tennessee Valley was only 45 percent of the
national average. Thousands of rural southern people had
no electricity, or running water, suffered failing crops year
after year from depleted and eroding soils and lived in abject
poverty. Additionally, the large timber companies had cut
the best timber using the common practice of "high-grading"
and clear-cutting. The nation as a whole was reeling from
the devastating impacts of the Great Depression, and the
South, particularly, the rural South, was in a desperate strug-
gle for survival.27
FDR responded with an unprecedented use of federal power. In
fact, one court specifically held that the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) amounted to a "social experiment" in government ownership
that violated the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.272 FDR de-
signed the TVA to be "a corporation clothed with the power of the
government" while retaining the "flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise." '273 FDR's plan for the TVA was an ambitious program of
federally sponsored and supervised investment to create "better op-
portunities and better places for living for millions of yet unborn. '27 4
The Tennessee Valley Authority Act mandated that the TVA under-
take, throughout the Tennessee Valley, the following programs: (a)
flood control; (b) development of the Tennessee River for navigation
purposes; (c) generation of electrical power; (d) development of mar-
ginal lands; (e) reforestation; and (f) securing the economic and so-
cial well-being of people within the Tennessee Valley.275 Congress
and the President endowed the TVA with vast powers to pursue these
objectives.2 76 The vastness of the TVA's authority is highlighted by the
271. Joe W. McCaleb, Stewardship of Public Lands and Cultural Resources in the Tennessee
Valley: A Critique of the Tennessee Valley Authority, I REs COMMUNES: VERMONT'S ENVL. L.J. 2
(1999).
272. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 9 F. Supp. 965, 966 (N.D. Ala. 1935), over-
ruled on other grounds, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
273. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Suggestion for Legislation to Create the Tennessee Valley
Authority (Apr. 10, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 122, 122.
274. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Informal Extemporaneous Remarks at Miami, Fla., Immedi-
ately Preceding Attempted Assassination of the President Elect (Feb. 15, 1933), in I THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 889 (extempo-
raneous remarks, January 21, 1933).
275. 16 U.S.C. § 831v (1994).
276. E.g., id. § 831c (empowering the TVA to acquire lands through exercising eminent
domain and to convey property).
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fact that it covers all of Tennessee and parts of six other states.27 7 The
278TVA was an unprecedented regional development initiative.
Scholars have generally recognized that the TVA succeeded in its
goal of developing a chronically depressed South by providing cheap
electricity to support industrialization.2 79 In fact, by 1944 the TVA was
the largest electricity producer in the nation and as recently as 1972
the TVA produced ten percent of the nation's power.2 8 ° In the long
run, the TVA's ability to supply cheap electricity spurred economic
growth.281 Yet, the success of the TVA has never been institutional-
ized in our system, and huge areas of economically deprived citizens
continue to fester despite the promise of the TVA.
2 8 2
C. Physical Infrastructure
In 1776, Adam Smith wrote that among the duties of the sover-
eign is the establishment and maintenance of "public works," which
though they may be most advantageous to society, are however, of
such a nature that "the profit could never repay the expense to any
individual. '283 In 1936, John Maynard Keynes argued that a program
of "socialisation of investment" was necessary in order to stimulate an
economy suffering from secular unemployment due to inadequate
consumption.28 4 Ironically, one of the earliest Keynesians was Her-
277. McCaleb, supra note 271, at 13.
278. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 153; see also DAVIS, supra note 242, at 94 (calling TVA a
truly revolutionary" initiative).
279. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 379.
280. JORDAN A. ScHWARz, THE NEW DEALERS 319 (1993).
281. Id. After its initial success in spurring economic development in a previously un-
derdeveloped region of the country, the TVA suffered from a number of organizational
infirmities that culminated in a disastrous nuclear energy program. See ERWIN C. HAR-
GROVE, PRISONERS OF MYTH: THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TENNESSEE VAL AUTHORITY 1933-
1990, at 195-241 (1994) (discussing political tensions and managerial turmoil at the TVA).
Commentators have concluded that the TVA's early success lead directly to its subsequent
failures. Id. at 281-305 (concluding that "persistence in the face of success" and "institu-
tional hubris" led to the decline of the TVA). An assessment of the aspects of its initial
structure that gave rise to these failures and possible remedies to stem such failures is
beyond the scope of this work. For purposes of this Article, it is only necessary to show that
government can undertake macroeconomically successful regional development initiatives.
282. The problems of community economic development are complex and perplexing.
The TVA demonstrates that government can succeed in developing previously impover-
ished areas. Unfortunately, the history of fighting urban blight and inner-city ghettos has
proven problematic. See Audrey F. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Eco-
nomic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 350-54 (1999) (comparing the Empowerment
Zone approach to development to prior efforts and concluding that such efforts too often
benefit "business elites").
283. 2 SMITH, supra note 13, at 208-09.
284. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 378 (Prometheus Books 1997) (1936). New Keynesians posit that all government
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bert Hoover-who before being elected President, produced a "Re-
port of the President's Conference on Unemployment" articulating
the value of a countercyclical public works program, complete with an
analysis of what Keynes would later call the multiplier effect.28 5 Hoo-
ver, however, was skeptical of expanding federal power; 286 FDR did
not share this compunction and consequently executed upon Hoo-
ver's idea.
One of the first acts of the first one hundred days of the New Deal
was a Federal Act for Relief of Unemployment through Public
Works.287 Tide II of the NIRA authorized the President to create the
Public Works Administration and provided $3.3 billion in initial fund-
ing.288 This was an exponential increase in the amount of public
works outlays under the Hoover Administration.289  Congress ap
proved expanded amounts for public works annually from 1934 to
1938.290 This public works initiative "marked the first clear recogni-
tion of the Federal Government's responsibility to . . .administer a
nationwide program of public works. 291
The legacy of the New Deal with respect to public works as a
means of intelligently enhancing macroeconomic performance has
been a mixed bag. During his campaign, FDR advocated a program
of counter-cyclical public works spending that originated in a report
drafted by none other than Herbert Hoover.292 Hoover specifically
spending is not created equal in terms of its beneficial impact on macroeconomic growth,
particularly when an economy is approaching full-employment levels. SeeW. Mark Crain &
Lisa K. Oakley, The Politics of Infrastructure, 38 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1995) (linking govern-
ment spending with macroeconomic growth). Instead, spending on physical infrastructure
has been shown to expand output on the supply side if the productivity of public invest-
ments in infrastructure are sufficiently high. Id. Commentators have focused, appropri-
ately, on the role of the law in structuring and organizing such investments in a way that
assures that the political process does not operate to deprive such investments of their
associated productivity enhancements. See id. at 15 (stating that "the marginal productivity
of public capital across political jurisdictions and over time depends in part on the inter-
play between existing institutional arrangements and the strategic use of infrastructure").
285. BARBER, supra note 6, at 15-22.
286. Contra id. at 41. Hooverites were "eager to expand the agenda of the state." Id.
287. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 23-5, 48 Stat. 22 (1933).
288. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Note, in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 250, 250.
289. BARBER, supra note 6, at 183.
290. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC WORS
EXPENDITURES 1933-1938, at 14-15 (1940).
291. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Note, in 2 THE PUBIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, supra note 11, at 250, 250.
292. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on a Program for Unemployment and
Long-Range Planning in Boston, Mass. (Oct. 31, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 100, at 850.
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accounted for the multiplier effect2 9 -the now mainstream macro-
economic idea that increases in spending spur further increases in
spending.294 While the New Deal certainly expanded public works
spending, this counter-cyclical concept has never been institutional-
ized.295 The best that can be said of the New Deal is that it was a
beginning, and has doubtlessly supported future public works suc-
cesses at the federal level. For example, FDR began a highway initia-
tive during World War II that ultimately led to the Interstate Highway
System. 296 Despite this central political failing, the New Deal public
works program "enhanced" the "national productive plant," had an
"impressive" impact on employment, and delivered a secondary fiscal




Government has a compelling economic interest in developing
the talents of its citizens to the maximum productive extent possible.
Such initiatives will increase tax revenues, provide a lower cost of
human capital to business and entrepreneurs, enhance productivity
growth and innovation, and reinforce the social infrastructure of an
economy by increasing the stakes individuals have in an economy and
increasing consumer buying power.
293. BARBER, supra note 6, at 18-19.
294. GORDON, supra note 20, at 72-73 (explaining how a $500 billion increase in govern-
ment expenditures can lead to a $2 trillion dollar increase in national income).
295. GALBRAITH, supra note 290, at III (transmittal letter to President Roosevelt, from
Frederic A. Delano).
The continued existence of unemployment as the central economic problem of
the United States makes evident the need for planning a public works program
on a long-range basis.... But even if unemployment should cease to be a major
national problem, the need for a continuing program of public works construc-
tion would not disappear. Orderly, administration, economical expenditure of
public funds and the sound development of the public plant are all frustrated by
annual "emergency programs."
See also Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor
Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 70-74 (2002) (showing problems with a politicized fiscal
policy function and proposing a depoliticized investment and fiscal function).
296. Louis Jacobson, Driving Force, June, 1996, at 19-21.
297. GALBRAITH, supra note 290, at 6, 56, 116-17. Of course, notwithstanding the fact
that the provision of physical infrastructure enhances productivity, such investments may
also enhance macroeconomic performance in terms of human infrastructure and social
infrastructure. See HowARD, supra note 28, at 777 (listing benefits of public works to in-
clude: "the preservation and improvement of skills and work habits" of otherwise unem-
ployed workers; "the preservation of public order"; and the "maintenance of economic
stability and purchasing power").
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1. The Civilian Conservation Corps.-The Public Works Bill gave
the President authority to employ citizens, who are unemployed, in
public works on government land.29 8 The Act specified that the work
relate to conservation or recreation purposes.29 9 By Executive Order,
FDR exercised this authority to create the Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC). °° The CCC was governed by a director and an advisory coun-
cil, consisting of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Interior. 30 1
The CCC's structure reflected its mission; it was more than a
mere jobs program, and its organization reflected that fact. The War
Department was given the job of organizing and managing the conser-
vation camps.3 12 The Department of Labor was in charge of selecting
enrollees.30 3 The Department of Agriculture and Department of the
Interior planned and supervised the conservation projects. 30 4 The
CCC was part boot camp, part job program, and part nature camp.
In order to enroll, workers needed to be unemployed, unmar-
ried, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, and of "good char-
acter." 30 ' Enrollees were required to send the bulk of their earnings
home to their families.30 6 The majority of the enrollees came from
congested cities. The program included an educational and skills
training element.3 0 7 By 1935, the enrolled strength of the CCC was
over 500,000.308 This was human development on a vast scale.
Because the program was more than a jobs program, it delivered
more benefits than just jobs. These youths learned teamwork, started
to take pride in their work and learned skills.30 9 They learned to drive
trucks, pour concrete and build bridges.' In the CCC, youths "re-
claimed and developed themselves."3 '' Pride, work ethic, and skills
no doubt helped the enrollees for years to come; but perhaps the
greatest benefit an enrollee enjoyed was the opportunity to leave deso-
298. See also Act of March 31, 1933, ch. 17, 48 Stat. 22 (codified as repealed at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 585-587 (2001)).
299. Id.
300. DAviS, supra note 242, at 77-79.





306. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 144.
307. II SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 339.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 338-39.
310. Id. at 338.
311. Id. at 338-39.
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late environments, like the East Side of New York, for places like
Mount Hood or Glacier National Park.3 12 FDR's program literally di-
verted human capital from prison or worse to productive use. 3 1
3
2. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the "GI Bill").-The
GI Bill 3 14 was the New Deal redux. After World War I, four million
veterans strained the economy, leading to three years of civil un-
rest. 31 5 During World War II, sixteen million Americans were in the
armed services; by the end of 1946, only three million remained in
uniform.31 6 Pessimism reigned. The economy's ability to absorb thir-
teen million veterans while faced with a rapidly decelerating level of
defense expenditures portended an economic "Pearl Harbor. '3 17 The
Labor Department projected an unemployment rate of well over
twenty percent.3 1 8 The end of the war severely tested the American
economy in general and the New Deal social-capitalism framework in
particular. As a result, unemployment climbed only to four percent
by 1948, and no major macroeconomic setback occurred. 1 9 This was
a stunning vindication of the New Deal and the GI Bill.
On June 22, 1944, FDR signed the GI Bill.3 2' FDR originally pro-
posed such a program in late 1943 and his goal was to economically
empower the nation's human resources to the maximum extent possi-
ble. 32 1 The GI Bill provided veterans with funds for vocational train-
ing and higher education, subsidized mortgages for housing, and
created low interest business loans.3 2 2 The GI Bill is a real novelty
insofar as government programs are concerned. Like the Interstate
Highway System or the Space Program, it is difficult to find any critics
of the GI Bill. On the other hand, the supporters of the Bill, and its
impact on our economy's macroeconomic performance, seem to
struggle for ways to express the extent of their positive views of the
legislation. Peter Drucker, the famed business management analyst,
312. Id. at 339.
313. Id. Professor Schlesinger termed the CCC "unquestionably one of the most fortu-
nate of New Deal inventions." Id. at 340.
314. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
315. MICHAELJ. BENNETT, WHEN DrEAMs CAME TRUE: THE GI BILL AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 3-4 (1996).
316. Id. at 4-5.
317. Id. at 194.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 195.
320. Id. at 192.
321. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the G.I. Bill of Rights (1944), reprinted
in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 309, 310-11 (John Gabriel Hunt ed., 1995).
322. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 786-87.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
identifies the GI Bill as one of the transformative events in history,
ushering in a "shift to the knowledge society."3 23 Drucker believes
that the GI Bill propelled our economy into a new era, just as the
steam engine did in the eighteenth century, and that this transforma-
tion will likely continue until 2010 or 2020.24 He concludes that the
GI Bill so reshaped our economic landscape that historians may well
identify it as "the most important event of the twentieth century."325
Other scholars agree with Drucker.3 26 The GI Bill is the "law that
worked" and that it not only paid for itself but yielded dividends as
well.3
27
David Kennedy states that the GI Bill had the effect of "propelling
an entire generation along an ascending curve of achievement and
affluence that their parents could not have dreamed. '3 23 Compelling
evidence supports these views.
In 1942, about 200,000 college degrees were awarded nation-
wide. 329 By 1950, that number soared to roughly 500,000.323 The ed-
ucational benefits also spurred the creation of many new colleges and
universities, including the entire State University of New York sys-
tem.33 ' Nearly half of the eligible veterans took advantage of the Bill's
educational benefits, at a total cost of $14.5 billion. The Department
of Labor found that the additional income earned as a result of the
enhanced education would generate increased tax revenues sufficient
to pay the costs of education several times over. 32 These tax benefits
have been calculated to amount to between five and twelve times the
cost to the government.3 33 All of this enhanced educational opportu-
323. PETER F. DRUCKER, POsT-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 3 (1993).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See BENNETr, supra note 315, at x-xv (explaining the significance of the GI Bill in
transforming American society and helping millions of ordinary Americans make their
dreams come true); KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 787 (stating that the GI Bill "stood out as the
most emblematic of all World War II-era political accomplishments").
327. See BENNETT, supra note 315, at 317. Michael Bennett writes:
The GI Bill .. .was the law that worked, the law that paid for itself and reaped
dividends because it made the American dream come true for so many. It ena-
bled millions of working-class people to make a middle-class way of life for them-
selves. It did it by giving them an educational grubstake and a homesteader's
claim on the New Frontier-but left the rest to them.
Id.
328. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 787.




333. See John Gillingham, Editorial, GI Bill: The First Voucher Plan, ST. Louis PosT-Dis-
PATCH, Jan. 30, 1996, at I IB; Mark Shields, America's Investment in the G.L Bill Paid Huge
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nity for veterans and spurred decades of enhanced labor productivity
and innovation.
The New Deal inaugurated the federal government's role in
human capital formation. The New Deal meant that, for the first time
in history, the government began to invest in its human resources.
Again, however, the New Deal failed to institutionalize this concept.
Government involvement in assuring human capital formation is to-
day uneven and chaotic, in large part because lawyers have failed to
propose appropriate legal institutions to facilitate appropriate human
capital formation.
E. Home Owners' Loan Act and National Housing Act
Perhaps the most transformative New Deal Acts were the revolu-
tionary Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA)3 3 4 and the creation of the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) .33 These Acts permanently
enhanced the nation's housing stock, stabilized the nation's social
fabric by increasing home ownership, and created a labor force with
increased productivity incentives that only a thirty-year mortgage obli-
gation can provide. 336 As such, this program enhanced the regulatory
infrastructure, social infrastructure, human infrastructure, and physi-
cal infrastructure supporting the nation's economy.33 7 The vigor of
the New Deal in addressing the housing crisis wrought by the Great
Dividends, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2000, at A7. This is consistent with studies
showing that government expenditures on education do not cost-they pay. See GEORGES
VERNEZ ET AL., CLOSING THE EDUCATION GAP: BENEFITS AND COSTS 78 (1999) (undertaking a
detailed study of costs and benefits of education spending and finding that closing the
education gap for "blacks and Hispanics... would clearly pay for itself in the form of long-
term savings in income transfer and social programs, increased tax revenues, and in-
creased disposable income for the individuals involved"); Edward P. St. John & Charles I.
Masten, Return on the Federal Investment in Student Financial Aid: An Assessment for the High
School Class of 1972,J. STUDENT FIN. AID, Fall 1990, at 4, 19 (stating "we conclude that the
net present value of each dollar invested in student aid during the 1970s was about $4.30").
Even these analyses may be stilted. Economists have identified educational investments as
a key element of macroeconomic growth. See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-
Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002, 1002-04 (1986) (showing that knowledge may be an
input that defies the law of diminishing marginal returns and may support increasing mar-
ginal productivity, thus explaining persistent divergent growth across nations).
334. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 122a (2000)).
335. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 203 (1985) (noting that "[n]o agency of the United States Government has
had a more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people over the past half-
century than the Federal Housing Administration").
336. Id. at 203-04.
337. See id. at 203-05.
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Depression is to be contrasted with the approach of the Hoover
Administration. In July of 1932, Hoover signed the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act.31 9 This Act established a credit reserve for mortgage
lenders to increase the supply of credit to the housing market. 4 '
Within the first two years of the law's operation, 41,000 homeowners
applied for loans and three were approved. 41
Within a few weeks of inauguration, FDR announced a "national
policy" that would impose "special safeguards" to facilitate home own-
ership, as a "guarantee of social and economic stability. '34 2 The
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) injected over $3 billion
into the savings and loan system for new loans immediately, and au-
thorized the purchase of distressed mortgages from lenders. 34 3 The
purchase of distressed mortgages greatly enhanced the position of
lenders and assisted borrowers by refinancing the obligations for
lower rates and at extended maturities. 344 This effectively "intro-
duced, perfected, and proved in practice the feasibility of the long-
term, self-amortizing mortgage." '45 The HOLA was followed by the
National Housing Act which created the FlA to insure home loans. 46
By 1937, over 250,000 mortgages were insured. 4 v FHA insured loans
eventually allowed buyers to purchase homes with less than ten per-
cent down.3 4 8 The government guarantee drove interest rates on
FHA mortgages down by two or three percentage points. 349 Thus, ex-
tended mortgage maturities, lower down payments, and lower interest
rates made home ownership more realistic for more Americans than
ever before.350
Proof of the New Deal's success seems convincing. Under the
pre-New Deal laissez-faire approach, housing markets could deliver
home ownership to only forty percent of Americans; four decades af-
338. For example, by the spring of 1933, half of all home mortgages in the U.S. were in
default. Id. at 193.
339. Id. at 194.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message Asking for Legislation to Save Small Home Mort-
gages from Foreclosure (Apr. 13, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRAN\K-
LIN D. RooSEvELT, supra note 11, at 135.
343. JACKSON, supra note 335, at 196.
344. Id at 196-97.
345. Id. at 196.
346. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (2000)).
347. 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at 235 (1938).
348. JACKSON, supra note 335, at 204.
349. Id. at 205.
350. See id. at 204-06.
560 [VOL. 62:515
2003] LAW AND MACROECONOMICS OF THE NEW DEAL AT 70 561
ter the New Deal, sixty-six percent of Americans owned their own
homes. 35 1 Before the New Deal maturities on home mortgages ran
five to ten years, and afterwards thirty-year mortgages became the
norm.35 2 Housing starts rose from 93,000 in 1933, to 332,000 in 1937,
and to 458,000 in 1939. s S  From a macroeconomic point of view, the
New Deal housing market interventions were a great success. 35 4 As
one commentator has recognized: "This New Deal 'reform' proved
not to have checked or intimidated capital as much as liberated it."
3 55
III. THE NEW DEAL: THE BIRTH OF LAW & MACROECONOMICS?
As the foregoing establishes, the New Deal was a bold attempt to
influence the macro economy on a broad range of fronts and through
the use of a variety of legal initiatives. One can, in fact, search the
legislative and executive branch histories of the key New Deal initia-
tives and find little or no reference to efficiency or other
microeconomic concerns. Instead, the entire effort focused on buy-
ing power, political stability, employment, investment, output and
productivity3 56-all elements of macroeconomic performance.
35 7
Macroeconomics was the aim of the law, from the federal securities
laws to the Wagner Act to the TVA.358 The New Deal was an attempt
born of economic desperation to place the American economy on a
351. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 370.
352. Id.
353. JACKSON, supra note 335, at 205.
354. However, the New Deal had other adverse effects in this area, including the inven-
tion of racial red-lining. See id. at 197 (describing HOLC's neighborhood rating system).
355. Id. at 205; see also II SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 298 (stating that HOLC "averted
the threatened collapse of the real estate market and enabled financial institutions to be-
gin to return to the mortgage-lending business" as well as strengthening the stake of
thousands of Americans in the U.S. economy).
356. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining the New Deal's desire to
achieve economic growth and output while also achieving other macroeconomic
objectives).
357. See GORDON, supra note 20, at 3 ("Macroeconomics is concerned with the big eco-
nomic issues that determine your own economic well-being as well as that of your family
and everyone you know."); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that macro-
economics concerns itself with "the behavior of economic aggregates"). In the context of
the West's failed globalization efforts of the 1990s, Nobel laureate Douglass North stated
well the difference between macro and micro economics. SILK ET AL., MAKING CAPITALISM
WORK 175 (1996) (citing Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Prize
Lecture in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Dec. 9, 1993)). He pointed out
that micro is about how markets operate and macro is about how an economy grows, devel-
ops, and can be managed. Id. According to North, globalization policy focused too much
on how markets operate (i.e., efficiency analysis) and not enough on how to develop mar-
kets. Id.
358. See supra Part I.
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more stable and productive foundation. At its most basic economic
level, the New Deal created legal structures, like deposit insurance
and securities regulation, to stabilize the investment channels that fed
industry.359 It created legal structures to stabilize employment mar-
kets.360 The New Deal was the first federal initiative to invest massively
in human and physical infrastructure.3 6' It created a whole new kind
of housing market to support long term economic growth and stabil-
ity.3 62 All of this amounted to the first wide-ranging government initi-
ative to restructure the economic system in the name of
macroeconomic management.3 63
The New Deal also went further. It created the tools of modern
conventional macroeconomic policy-fiscal and monetary policy.
Without the legal innovations endowing the Fed with a high degree of
political independence, it would be difficult to imagine government
utilizing monetary policy in such a way.364 While no similar structures
were institutionalized with respect to fiscal policy, the New Deal began
a discussion along those lines. The great illusion of the New Deal is
that it fully inaugurated Keynesian economics. 365 In fact, Keynesian
fiscal policy has never been instituted. Government has never really
engaged in any organized effort to achieve the "socialisation of invest-
ment.1366 Nevertheless, the New Deal at least shows the potential of
this function as a lesson that is sorely needed in today's economic en-
vironment. Keynes is famous for the innovation of economic stimulus
359. See supra Parts II.A. 1 and II.B (discussing the roles of securities regulation and the
FDIC in fueling the economy).
360. See supra notes 283-291 and accompanying text (explaining the need for stimula-
tion in the economy in order to reduce unemployment and the institution of the NIRA).
361. See supra Parts II.D and II.E (discussing the need for physical and human infrastruc-
tures to contribute to growth of the economy and society).
362. See supra notes 340-350 (observing that the HOLA and National Housing Act al-
lowed more people than ever before to buy and insure homes).
363. Great Britain also undertook significant improvements to its macroeconomic infra-
structure in the 1930s, in response to its own macroeconomic difficulties. For example,
the British moved off the gold standard in 1931, two years before the United States and
thereafter allowed monetary expansion to stem the economic contraction. VENN, supra
note 97, at 107. Also, the British expanded government assistance to the housing sector.
Id. Both of these initiatives were key elements of the New Deal. However, Great Britain
was already ahead of the U.S. in many other areas of macroeconomic infrastructure, in-
cluding financial market regulation, labor legislation, and social security, before the onset
of the Great Depression. See id. at 108-09.
364. See supra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (explaining how the independence
of the Fed led to the elasticity of currency and the emergence of modern monetary policy).
365. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 357-62 (stating that the New Deal did not intentionally
undertake deficit spending in an effort to stimulate the economy until April, 1938, and
even then it was a modest degree of stimulus).
366. KEYNES, supra note 284, at 378.
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through the use of fiscal policy.3 67 One famous quote attributed to
Keynes is a rhetorical flourish in support of the need to manage gov-
ernment spending to add stimulus when needed: "If the Treasury
were to fill old bottles with bank-notes, bury them at suitable depths in
disused coal-mines.. . and leave it to private enterprise... to dig up
the notes again . . .there need be no more unemployment and ...
real income . . .would probably become a good deal greater. "368
Keynes spoke in 1936 about a very specific reality: governments that
failed to manage fiscal policy to countercyclical contractions. 369
Keynes never advocated endless deficit spending without regard to the
productive return of such spending. This, in essence, is what caused
so-called Keynesianism to hit the wall in the 1970s. 37' This kind of
Keynesianism run amok increases tax burdens and distorts investment
resources in a negative manner.3 7 ' Unless government spending is
productively deployed, the principle of conservation of energy applies
to fiscal stimulus-without productivity gains, increased tax burdens
make deficits a zero-sum game in the long run. This is why Keynes was
so focused on investment management as central to fiscal policy.
372
Investment means payback with dividends, with a modicum of
risk.37 3 Although studies are difficult to come by, this is the distin-
guishing feature of the New Deal. 74 FDR seemed to be groping
around this idea throughout the course of the New Deal. This is an
essentially capitalist view of the role of government in a market econ-
omy-dating back to Adam Smith. 375 The New Deal was not about
spending for spending sake-FDR intuitively understood that not all
federal spending is created equal.3 76 This is also a central lesson from
367. Id.
368. Id. at 129. Keynes also stated, "It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses
and the like." Id.
369. See Louis Menand, Buried Treasure; The Impish Brilliance ofJohn Maynard Keynes, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 28, 2002, at 82 (noting Keynes's disdain for laissez-faire economics).
370. GORDON, supra note 20, at A4 to A6 (showing that the United States generally ran
budget deficits from 1970 to 1997).
371. Ramirez, supra note 295, at 70-71.
372. See KEYNES, supra note 284, at 378; see also KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 357 (quoting
letter from Keynes to FDR in 1937 stating, "[D]urable investment must come increasingly
under state direction").
373. KEYNES, supra note 284, at 375.
374. See SCHWARZ, supra note 280, at xi (explaining that the New Deal represented a
"massive governmental recapitalization for purposes for economic development").
375. See supra note 16 (describing the importance of government policies in creating an
infrastructure to promote economic growth).
376. For example, FDR stated that work relief must be based upon useful tasks, in the
sense that the work would provide "permanent improvement in living conditions or ...
create[ ] new wealth for the nation." DAvis, supra note 242, at 464.
563
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the New Deal: Policymakers should create infrastructure that benefits
the economy by creating a more stable and prosperous consumer
base, a more productive and skilled labor force, a physical infrastruc-
ture that lowers costs to business, and regulation that makes markets
more stable or lowers capital costs. This is the framework for law and
macroeconomics that the New Deal provides.
For all of its prodigious successes and prodigious failures, the
New Deal appears to have been highly successful in fostering eco-
nomic growth and stability."' Since the Great Depression, the econ-
omy of the United States has been one of the most successful in global
history.3 7 While correlation and causation are different, the role of
the New Deal in fostering this success enjoys a strong theoretical basis
that ultimately has its roots in Adam Smith as well as John Maynard
Keynes and the new macroeconomics that has emerged since 1990-
some sixty years after FDR inherited a comatose American economy.
In the end, the New Deal is simply about providing free markets the
kind of economic infrastructure to facilitate the maximum success of
capitalism. Indeed, recently, prominent economists, including Nobel
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have shown that the central failing of global-
ization has been a failure to impose the kind of legal infrastructure
promulgated under the New Deal.3 7 Thus, experience, theory, and
common sense all counsel that the New Deal's law and macroeconom-
ics have fostered enhanced growth and stability. 380 Certainly, it would
be helpful to have detailed empirical analyses of the economic conse-
377. In 1920 to 1922, the economy contracted 17.3%. In 1907, the economy contracted
7.4%. In 1929 to 1933, the economy contracted 33%. Since then there has not been a
single contraction of the same magnitude as these three contractions. Thus, from 1907 to
1929, a period of twenty-two years, the economy suffered three significant contractions. In
seventy years since the beginning of the New Deal, no contraction of similar magnitude has
occurred. Since the end of the Depression in 1938, there has only been one year of nega-
tive economic growth. In 1949, the economy suffered a contraction of 0.8%. The laissez-
faire record of stability and growth pales in comparison to the post-New Deal record. See
GORDON, supra note 20, at Al to A2; see also id. at 15 (graphing economic volatility before
and after the New Deal).
378. See id. at 312 (demonstrating how the U.S. has lead most of the industrialized world
in growth since the Great Depression); SCHWARZ, supra note 280, at 344 ("Overall the New
Dealers built the world's largest middle-class society by . . . respond[ing] adroitly and
speedily to the exigencies of the Great Depression."); see also GALBRAITH, supra note 4, at
191-93 (concluding with respect to the New Deal that "[a]n angry god may have endowed
capitalism with inherent contradictions. But at least as an afterthought he was kind
enough to make social reform surprisingly consistent with improved operation of the
system.").
379. STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at 55, 139, 155, 249.
380. Recently, economists including Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas have empirically
studied economic growth and worked to develop an exogenous growth theory that ex-
plains the dynamics of technical innovation-a topic sorely unexplained by neoclassical
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quences of a wide variety of infrastructure investments. In fact, some-
times these studies are available. 381' However, in the absence of
empirical studies on point, all that is available today is experience,
theory, international comparative analysis,3 82 and common sense.
The methodology is not precise and the proof is less than ideal.
These are, however, inherent conditions of lawmaking. It necessarily
proceeds in an environment of imperfect information. One commen-
tator, in fact, claims that "there is far less professional consensus about
the working of the macroeconomy than about microeconomics. '383
Nevertheless, too often the efficiency obsession underlaying law and
economics fails to even address the impact of law upon unemploy-
ment, output, GDP, inflation, productivity, growth, or any other
macroeconomic aggregates. Micro-analysis is no more determinative,
objective, or clear than macro-analysis, at least as a normative talis-
man. Even if this is not correct, however, microeconomics still asks all
the wrong questions. At least macroeconomics asks the correct ques-
tions. Specifically, macroeconomics queries how to increase output,
enhance productivity, and stabilize the economy.38
4
Further, the impact of the law on the macroeconomy is unavoida-
ble. The New Deal shows that legal scholars must think about law and
macroeconomics. Lawyers and lawmakers are constantly involved in
law and macroeconomic analysis even if they blatantly ignore it.
Given this central reality, it is time to find and secure (through law-
theory. E.g., Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3 (1988).
381. For example, the Congressional Budget Office compiled a study of the macroeco-
nomic effect of the savings and loan crisis and concluded that it cost over $500 billion in
foregone GDP alone. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S. C. Section 1821(k), supra note 26, at 629.
Similarly, every economic analysis of education expenditures shows that the expenditures
are investments, in that they yield enhanced tax revenues that exceed the amounts of in-
vestment and they yield dividends to the economy in the form of an enhanced stock of
human capital. E.g., BENNETT, supra note 315, at 242.
382. Economists have recently engaged in detailed comparative analysis of economic
growth. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q. J.
ECON. 407, 437 (1991) (finding that human and physical capital, as well as political stabil-
ity, are positively associated with growth). Great Britain furnishes an excellent comparative
analysis that suggests that the New Deal enhanced macroeconomic performance. Great
Britain came out of the economic contraction "far sooner" than the U.S., and did not
suffer as deeply as the U.S. VENN, supra note 97, at 106-07. Great Britain already had much
of the macroeconomic infrastructure that the New Deal constructed. Id. at 108-09. Great
Britain's GDP grew 18% from 1929 to 1937; while the U.S. grew only 6%. Id at 107. How-
ever, long-term factors allowed the U.S. to greatly outperform Great Britain from 1870 to
1998. GORDON, supra note 20, at 312-33.
383. Kelman, supra note 27, at 1217.
384. See SOWELL, supra note 98, at 71-72 (describing macroeconomists as being primarily
concerned with growth).
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making) a more ideal macroeconomic infrastructure, and a more ob-
jective and precise basis for identifying elements of the more ideal
infrastructure. At the very least, the obsession with laissez-faire effi-
ciency must end.3 5 Laissez-faire is dead; it died in the parade of eco-
nomic disruptions and depressions that hit the American economy
with great regularity in the early part of the twentieth century. The
only issue remaining is not the extent of government involvement in
the economy, but the nature of government involvement. Instead of
using government resources to build infrastructure (in every dimen-
sion), spending is driven primarily by politics-and special interests in
low saliency areas.38 6 Government presence is still massive, and is just
corrupted by politics and laissez-faire rhetoric. 38 7 The question for
law and macroeconomics is how to rationalize this massive
presence. 88
One measure of the massive presence of the federal government
in our economy is the proportion of GNP that is consumed by the
government. In the pre-New Deal Era the federal government spent
about three percent of GNP, and today it spends about twenty per-
cent.38 The Social Security and Medicare Program each represent
social infrastructure enhancements that touch nearly all Americans
385. The obsession with efficiency has infected the stunted efforts of the West to achieve
economic globalization. See SILK ET AL., supra note 357, at 167-68 (offering different views
of the American economic ideology). Basically, since the Great Depression, social respon-
sibility for macroeconomic performance, as expressed in law, has largely been successful.
Id. at 172. Similarly, developing countries would be better served by shifting "support from
stabilization to public works and social service programs, as happened in the United States
during the New Deal." Id. at 78. Nevertheless, the "economic doctors ... in thrall to free-
market ideology" could not get beyond laissez-faire. Id. at 174-75. More work needs to be
done to explore the role that global social capitalism can play in facilitating a more power-
ful globalized world economy. See Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco:
Globalization as Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law and Economics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. (forth-
coming 2003) (reviewing JosEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCOrENTS (2002))
(showing that globalization has been plagued by the same market fundamentalism that
dominates the law and economics movement and arguing that law and economics is in
danger of being so removed from economic science that it may be termed law and pseudo-
economics).
386. Ramirez, supra note 198, at 555-59.
387. See generally id. at 559-79 (assessing how politics interacted with and undermined
financial regulation over the last seventy years).
388. Economists desperately need the legal profession to provide adequate "legal,
moral, and institutional foundations" to enhance economic growth. Cf SILK ET AL., supra
note 357, at 174 (noting the need for these same foundations for economic rebuilding
after World War II). For example, the New Deal provided adequate institutional founda-
tions for modern monetary policy. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
389. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 55.
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and cost billions of dollars per year.390 Expenditures for physical in-
frastructure, human infrastructure, and regulatory infrastructure simi-
larly occupy large claims on the federal budget.39 ' This upsurge in
government spending represents a dramatic increase in the presence
of the federal government that commenced with the New Deal.39 2
However, government spending understates the role of the gov-
ernment in the economy. The Fed, in its modern manifestation, con-
sumes zero dollars of the federal budget.3 9 3  Yet, it holds a
commanding position in the economy, thanks in large part to the in-
novations of the New Deal in putting monetary policy on a firmer ba-
sis.3 94 This innovation is a permanent feature of the American
capitalist system and any effort to repeal it or cut back the role of the
Fed in our economy would surely lead to economic catastrophe.3 9 5
Capitalism, on a world-wide basis, would insist on a depoliticized cen-
tral bank to maintain the integrity of American monetary policy and
particularly to control inflation and stem downward spirals.3 9 6 Conse-
quently, the Fed is a permanent feature of our political economy that
will continue to wield tremendous influence over virtually all aspects
of our economic life. Here again, the New Deal legacy manifests
itself.
Even with the massive economic influence of the Fed accounted
for, there is still more intervention. The entire financial system of our
economy is a highly regulated industry as a result of the New Deal.39 7
Much of this regulation has been aimed at securing investor confi-
dence. 398 With respect to deposit insurance, the cost of investor confi-
390. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FiscAL
YEAR 2002, at 17 (2002) (showing that combined spending on Medicare and Social Security
is projected to be approximately $675 billion in 2002).
391. See id. at 15-18 (providing government expenditure figures for a variety of
programs).
392. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 55.
393. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text (explaining that the Federal Re-
serve Board is self-funded and its operations are not included in the United States'
budget).
394. For example, shortly after the Twin Towers Tragedy of September 11, 2001, the
Fed cut rates for the eighth time of the year. Stevenson, supra note 1.
395. See Ramirez, supra note 198, at 530 n.145 and accompanying text (stating that the
Fed's political independence is a key element to its success).
396. See id. at 547 n.266 and 549 n.279 (finding that the Fed's political independence
enables it to curb inflation).
397. See supra Part II (describing the affect of law and macroeconomics on the New
Deal).
398. See supra Part II.A (describing the new legislation enacted by Congress in the New
Deal era to bolster investor confidence).
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dence has been huge subsidies to the entire banking industry.399
Beyond the financial system, however, the Social Security Act and the
Wagner Act touch every significant employer and virtually all employ-
ees.4 °° Each of these acts represent a regulatory effort to build a
firmer social infrastructure that has served as a platform for more eco-
nomic growth and economic stability for seven decades.
With respect to government investment, yet another element of
massive intervention must be accounted for. Government spending is
not equal in terms of expected benefits. Some forms of government
spending are more productive than others. The GI Bill, the Interstate
Highway Act, and the Space Program all appear to be productive gov-
ernment spending. The start of this kind of federal productivity en-
hancing spending began with the New Deal, particularly with respect
to investment in human capital. 4 ' These programs show that rational
government investment can enhance macroeconomic growth.4" 2
Given the reality of the government's massive presence in the
economy and the legal structures around which that intervention
orbits, a scholar may ask why so little legal analysis is focused on how
the law organizes these efforts at economic growth and stabiliza-
403tion. One answer is that law and economics is dominated by schol-
ars fixated on efficiency and microeconomic analysis. 40 4 This focus is
problematic. This efficiency focus generally leads to market funda-
mentalism;4 5 indeed, it is rare that efficiency alone is a justification
for effective government policy beyond recognition of property rights
and enforcement of contracts. Market fundamentalism, in turn, has
been shown to be bad economics at best, in terms of delivering
399. To the extent the government guarantees the deposits of banks, banks can attract
cheaper funds.
400. See II SCHLESINGER, supra note 30, at 314 (commenting that "[n]o government bu-
reau ever touched the lives of so many millions" as the Social Security Board).
401. See supra Part II.E (discussing government initiatives to stimulate growth in human
capital).
402. See DRUCKER, supra note 323, at 166 (identifying one of the aims of fiscal policy as
"encourag[ing] ... [the] investment in knowledge and in human resources, in productive
facilities in business, and in infrastructure").
403. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (describing how past legal scholars
focused on efficiency and not on supporting greater macroeconomic performance).
404. Judge Posner, for example, states that efficiency is "the main thing that students of
public policy do or should worry about." POSNER, supra note 18, at 13.
405. Market fundamentalism involves an extreme ideological insistence on free markets
unfettered by significant government action and with little regard to economic science. See
STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at xi-xii, xiii, 12, 35, 36, 58, 139, 219 and 221.
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economic growth and stability.
40 6
The New Deal macroeconomic legacy is ultimately quite
profound. It shows that legislation and executive power can be used
to secure a more powerful political economy, and it suggests that
courts need to keep macroeconomic considerations in mind when in-
terpreting such laws. Ultimately, the New Deal begs a critical ques-
tion: if our economic system rested upon macroeconomically
optimized legal structures (legislative, judicial, and regulatory), how
much additional potential growth would be accessible to our society?
The New Deal suggests that a fully rationalized economy would mark-
edly outperform our current system.
CONCLUSION
After the New Deal, it is clear that maximum macroeconomic
performance is a function of free markets and optimal legal infrastruc-
ture. Beyond this, the New Deal teaches much more.
First, never again can any administration or Congress ignore eco-
nomic conditions or economic policy analysis. The days of laissez-
faire government are forever gone because the days of a laissez-faire
economic mind set among the American body politic are forever
gone. Voters demand economic growth and will hold political leaders
responsible for economic failings. Leaders may debate the precise
role of government and whether less regulation, less taxation, or less
government involvement is desirable. However, in the end, the New
Deal marks the beginning of an era where government is expected to
manage the economy. Thus, the question is not how much macroeco-
nomic influence the federal government has; rather, it is how can law
best rationalize government's influence.
Second, the New Deal began government management of eco-
nomic aggregates in the United States through regulation of fiscal pol-
icy and monetary policy. The New Deal showed the power of fiscal
policy to stimulate the economy to achieve accelerated growth. Ever
since the New Deal, lawmakers in the executive and legislative
branches must reckon with the fiscal consequences of their lawmaking
functions and the impact of government finances on macroeconomic
performance. Perhaps more importantly, the New Deal created the
regulatory infrastructure necessary to support the functioning of mod-
ern monetary policy instruments. After the New Deal, it became ap-
406. STIGLITZ, supra note 17, at xiii and 250 (stating that market fundamentalism should
be replaced with a more balanced consideration of market failures as well as government
failures).
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parent that the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board was one of the
most important figures in the American economic system because of
the power of monetary policy within the regulatory framework largely
provided by the New Deal. Here too, the New Deal legacy is perma-
nent. It is inconceivable in a modern industrialized economy for gov-
ernment ever to abandon fiscal and monetary policy tools. The law's
task is to find methods to ideally institutionalize these macroeconomic
policy tools. The law has only partially discharged this task.
Third, the New Deal was the beginning of an experimental exer-
cise in trying to find the optimal macroeconomic regulatory infra-
structure for a modern capitalistic economy. The New Deal's most
notable successes appear to be federal deposit insurance and the fed-
eral securities laws. While both of these initiatives have been subject
to neoclassical attacks and tinkering, both enjoy an enviable track re-
cord in terms of supporting long term growth and stability.4"7 The
New Deal was an attempt to place capitalism on a firmer regulatory
foundation. Again, given the modern state-business coalition that
manages the economy and their efforts in rationalizing the business
environment, there appears to be litfle likelihood that the form of
capitalism launched (or at least greatly extended) by the New Deal
will ever be completely reversed. The search has begun for a
macroeconomically optimal legal infrastructure.
Fourth, lurking behind the New Deal was an important new eco-
nomic idea: the government acting as investor of last resort. The New
Deal's public works programs sought to elevate government spon-
sored investment to a macroeconomically significant degree. Here,
the New Deal legacy is more ambiguous. Government seems to have
great difficulty in rationalizing its approach to providing physical in-
frastructure. Since the New Deal's efforts to stimulate the economy
through government managed investment, there has been no system-
atic means of identifying investment projects and managing economic
aggregates through government investment. Not all government ex-
penditures are created equal. However, it seems to be only a matter
of time before cost-justified productivity enhancing government in-
vestment is recognized as a means of institutionalized government in-
volvement in the economy.
Fifth, the New Deal marked the beginning of the government's
efforts to engineer a more economically optimal social infrastructure.
The TVA showed that massive federally sponsored community devel-
407. Scott & Mayer, supra note 208, at 858-59 (extolling the stabilizing effect of deposit
insurance).
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opment programs can invest in areas left behind by market forces in a
cost-effective manner.4 °8 Social Security and the NLRA represent the
first wave of government initiatives designed to create a social struc-
ture that can support an enhanced consumer market for superior ex-
ploitation by successful businesses and entrepreneurs. The creation
of the NLRB was specifically aimed at extending greater bargaining
power to labor in order to enhance middle class buying power.
40 9
HOLA was specifically designed to create a strong home-owning mid-
dle class that ultimately came to support much of the consumer cul-
ture of the latter part of the twentieth century.4 10 While government
has not generally managed social infrastructure in a rational fashion
since the New Deal, it is hard to imagine that the federal government
will ever exit this arena completely.
Sixth, the New Deal tried to create a system for developing suffi-
cient human infrastructure to facilitate the success of capitalism. The
CCC was more than just a jobs program; it was a quasi-military sociali-
zation program that gave workers marketable skills.4 1 ' Indeed, most
of the New Deal's permanent initiatives took a pronounced workfare
approach over a relief approach for the very reason that FDR did not
believe it helped the dispossessed to give them only money.41 2 The GI
Bill fueled decades of growth through education expenditures that
significantly improved the quality of the nation's human capital.
4 1 3
The New Deal spawned the first programs specifically designed to up-
grade the quality of the American labor force.
After the New Deal's massive government management, massive
government regulation and massive government expenditures in sup-
port of economic growth and stability became the norm.4 14 Some
408. See McCaleb, supra note 271, at 18 (stating, "TVA was created in the New Deal era
and worked as an efficient mechanism for over 60 years contributing significantly to the
rural South's rise from economic despair to prosperity").
409. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)).
410. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128, 128 (1933) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 122a (2000)) (stating the purpose of the Act as "[t]o provide
emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness, to refinance home mort-
gages, [and] to extend relief to the owners of homes occupied by them").
411. Act of Mar. 31, 1933, ch. 17, 48 Stat. 22 (codified as repealed at 16 U.S.C. §§ 585-
587 (2000)) (stating that the purpose of the Act was to relieve unemployment through the
use of public works projects).
412. See DAvis, supra note 242, at 464 (highlighting excerpts from FDR's 1935 State of
the Union address that focused on work relief and the theory behind it).
413. See BENNETT, supra note 315, at 7 (stating that "[t]he GI Bill was the catalyst creat-
ing our present postcapitalist society").
414. See Bordo et al., supra note 96, at 10 (explaining that the New Deal initiated a huge
expansion in the size of the federal government).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
may debate the details of the government's role, and some may clothe
their approach in more free-market rhetoric,415 but no serious politi-
cian really argues in favor of removing the government from the eco-
nomic system in a manner similar to the pre-New Deal regime.
Politicians debate how much to spend on defense and how the tax
burden should be allocated, but government is always tacitly held re-
sponsible for economic performance, and the government's expendi-
tures always remain huge.4" 6 Indeed, so entrenched is the massive
government role, that it is reasonable to conclude that the New Deal
marked the end of capitalism and left a new system of political econ-
omy in its place; a system where all of society has a voice in the how to
manage the business of business. Although free-market rhetoric still
attracts votes, and some significant scholarly support,417 it seems the
New Deal is destined to ultimately reshape the debate over the proper
role of government. Eventually, the body politic is bound to under-
stand that the debate is no longer a contest of free-market solutions
versus government solutions; instead, it is how government should
most rationally manage the economy given its massive role. From the
New Deal on, the economy was managed through a coalition of busi-
ness elites and society generally, speaking through political and aca-
demic elites. Capitalism thereby became social capitalism. And social
capitalism implies a central role for law and macroeconomics-that is
lawyers rationally organizing, through law and regulation, the massive
role of government to further the twin goals of macroeconomic stabil-
ity and growth.
415. See generally 2 SMITH, supra note 13 (setting forth the free-market theory).
416. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 390, at 18 (estimating that the
mandatory outlays for the 2002 United States budget will exceed $1.2 trillion).
417. See, e.g., 2 SMITH, supra note 13 (setting forth the free-market theory).
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